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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fundamental changes are underway in the electric utility industry in the 
United States. The industry is moving away from the traditional model 
featuring large, centralized generating stations to an innovative approach 
involving increased integration of distributed generation (DG) resources 
and greater reliance on customer-driven energy choices such as energy 
efficiency and demand response (DR) programs.1 These changes are largely 
driven by economics and advancing technology: the costs of DG resources, 
particularly solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, have declined considerably in 
recent years, resulting in increased penetration of DG resources and 
corresponding reductions in electricity demand being placed on the local 
utility, as customers “self-generate” their own power.2 Improved and lower 
cost technology has also given utility customers an increased ability to 
exercise control of their energy usage, through demand-side management 
(DSM) programs. These measures have the effect of reducing the level of 
electricity sales from the local utility. 
Given these trends away from exclusive reliance on the local electric 
utility, considerable attention has recently been focused on the incompatibility 
of the utility business model with the widespread deployment of DG 
resources and this customer-centric business model. In January 2013, the 
Edison Electric Institute, the association representing all U.S. investor-
 
 1.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), Distributed Energy, available at 
http://energy.gov/oe/technology-development/smart-grid/distributed-energy (DG resources 
are small-scale electric generating units that are located close to customer loads. Energy 
efficiency programs encourage utility customers to use less energy while performing 
the same functions, such as replacing an incandescent lightbulb with a compact fluorescent one 
or replacing an appliance with a model that uses energy more efficiently). LAWRENCE 
BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, What’s Energy Efficiency, http://eetd.lbl.gov/ee/ 
ee-1.html (DR programs encourage electric customers to reduce or shift their energy usage 
during peak periods, in response to financial incentives). DOE, Demand Response, 
http://energy.gov/oe/technology-development/smart-grid/demand-response. 
 2.  See infra Section II.A. 
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owned electric companies,3 published a report, Disruptive Challenges, 
which highlighted the challenges to the electric utility industry posed by 
widespread deployment of DG resources.4 The report identified a 
convergence of factors—including the declining costs of DG resources—
that potentially could “challenge and transform” the electric utility industry.5 
According to the report, the traditional utility model of centralized generation 
could be threatened as these DG technologies become more cost-competitive.6 
The report concluded that as DG resources achieve increased penetration in 
the future, the industry and its stakeholders will need to take action to 
respond to these challenges to minimize the impact of the “disruptive 
forces.”7 
Another driver of these fundamental changes occurring in the electric 
utility industry is the benefit that DG resources provide in improving 
system resilience in the face of climate change and the increasing 
frequency of extreme weather events.8 In this regard, Hurricane Sandy 
(ultimately downgraded to “Superstorm” Sandy by the time it hit the 
coasts of New York and New Jersey in late October 2012) provided a 
“wake up call” to the industry regarding the vulnerability of the existing 
utility grid, the resilience benefits of DG resources, and the urgent need 
 
 3.  EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, Mission & Vision, http://www.eei.org/about/ 
mission/Pages/default.aspx. 
 4.  Peter Kind, Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications and Strategic 
Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, 1 (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf [hereinafter Disruptive 
Challenges]. 
 5.  Id. (Disruptive Challenges report identified a number of emerging DG 
technologies that could provide competition for utility-provided services, including 
solar PV, battery storage, fuel cells, geothermal systems, wind micro turbines, and enhanced 
storage from electric vehicles).  Id. at 4. 
 6.  Id. at 3. 
 7.  Id. at 17. 
 8.  New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case 13-E-0030, Order Approving Electric, Gas 
and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint Proposal, 63, n.47 (Feb. 21, 2014), available at 
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo= 
13- E-0030 (The decision of the New York PSC in a recent Con Edison case defined 
resilience as going beyond the “hardening” of existing utility infrastructure to reduce 
the impact of severe storms. Adopting the definition from the NYS 2100 Report, the 
CON EDISON ORDER defined resilience as “the ability of a system to withstand shocks 
while still maintaining its essential functions.”) [hereinafter CON EDISON ORDER]; Id. 
(citing NYS 2100 COMMISSION, Recommendations to Improve the Strength and 
Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure, 24, http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/  
documents/NYS2100.pdf) [hereinafter NYS 2100 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
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to engage in long-term planning that focus on strategies to improve the 
ability of the electric system to cope with the anticipated extreme weather 
events of the future. About 8.5 million utility customers in the eastern U.S. 
lost power during Sandy, and more than 650,000 homes were damaged or 
destroyed.9 The experience of Superstorm Sandy provides a case study of 
the system resilience benefits of DG resources, and the lessons that can be 
learned as utilities plan for increasingly frequent extreme weather events. 
Apart from the impact of Superstorm Sandy on the electric utilities 
operating in the region, the event provided an opportunity for a 
fundamental re-examination of the electric utility business model and the 
associated regulatory framework. Within months of Superstorm Sandy, 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con Edison), the utility 
serving New York City, proposed substantial rate increases to cover the 
expenditures to “harden” the utility system and reinforce the traditional 
central generation model (and associated transmission and distribution 
(T&D) systems).10 Con Edison’s January 2013 rate request in New York 
included a commitment to spend $1 billion in “storm hardening structural 
improvements” over the subsequent four year period.11 The Con Edison 
rate proceeding before the New York Public Service Commission evolved 
into an extended proceeding examining the lessons learned from Superstorm 
Sandy, the need for changes to utility long-term system planning to address 
climate change, and the possible role of DG resources in improving the 
resilience of the electric grid. 
Shortly after concluding the Con Edison rate proceeding in February 2014, 
the New York PSC issued a significant order commencing a broader 
proceeding, Reforming the Energy Vision, or REV, to examine the utility 
business model and possible changes to the framework for regulating electric 
utilities.12 The REV proceeding has attracted substantial national 
attention, given the comprehensive investigation being undertaken by the 
New York PSC and the participation of a broad group of stakeholders in the 
 
 9.  Id. at 15; Doyle Rice & Alia Dastagir, One Year After Sandy, 9 Devastating Facts, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/29/sandy-
anniversary-facts-devastation/3305985/. 
 10.  Letter from Craig S. Ivey, President, Con Edison to Jeffrey C. Cohen, Acting 
Secretary, New York PSC at 1, New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case 13-E-0030, 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., (Jan. 25, 2013) (No. 985), 
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={B81F8F41
-1051-4A89-877C-81C0DB7FB629}. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case 14-M-0101, Proceeding on Motion of 
the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Order Instituting Proceeding (Apr. 
25, 2014), available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster. 
aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-m-0101&submit=Search+by+Case+Number [hereinafter REV ORDER]. 
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proceeding.13 In addition to the New York proceeding, this examination 
of a possible new utility business model, commonly referred to as “Utility 
2.0,” is being undertaken in several other jurisdictions throughout the 
country.14 
This Article examines the drivers for this perceived need to revisit the 
utility business model, focusing primarily on the declining cost of DG 
resources and the resilience benefits of DG resources in addressing the 
impact of future extreme weather events. Second, this article reviews the 
various “Utility 2.0” proceedings underway across the United States, and 
the common themes emerging from those proceedings. The third section 
of the Article discusses the possible approaches to a utility business 
model, based on experience in wholesale and retail electricity markets in 
the United States and Europe. Fourth, this Article will examine lessons 
learned regarding the success of business structures in achieving the 
objective of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to electric network, based on 
previous industry restructurings, including the actions of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to restructure the electric industry 
during the 1990s, as well as the experience in Europe with the various 
utility business models. Finally, the Article concludes with recommendations 
and a discussion of the challenges facing regulators as they assume the 
task of defining the Utility 2.0 business model. 
II.  DRIVERS OF THE CHANGING UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL 
A.  Improving Economics of DG Resources 
The Disruptive Challenges report from the Edison Electric Institute 
identifies the threat to the traditional utility business model posed by 
continuing declines in the cost of DG resources, particularly solar PV 
panels.15 That document cites a decline in the price of solar PV panels 
 
 13.  New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case 14-M0101, DPS Straw Proposal on Track 
One Issues, at 2 (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/ 
Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={CA26764A-09C8-46BF-9CF6-F5215F63EF62 
[hereinafter TRACK ONE PROPOSAL]. 
 14.  See infra Section III. 
 15.  Disruptive Challenges, supra note 4, at 4 (Other forms of DG resources include 
combined heat and power (CHP, or cogeneration), small wind turbines, fuel cells, and 
microturbines); Creating a 21st
 
Century Electricity System for New York State, An Energy 
Industry Working Group Position Paper, ADVANCED ENERGY ECONOMY 5 (Feb. 26, 2014), 
available at https://www.aee.net/initiatives/21st-century-electricity-system.html#ny-
state-energy-industry-working-group  (In addition, to the extent these DG resources are 
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from $3.80 per watt in 2008 to $0.86 per watt in 2012, with anticipated 
further price decreases as the solar industry continues to scale up.16 When 
accompanied by continued increases in the price of electricity sold by 
utilities, the Disruptive Challenges report concludes that energy from 
solar PV is currently cost-competitive in about 16 percent of the U.S. 
retail electricity market.17 By 2017, about one-third of annual electric 
utility revenue, or $170 billion, is projected by the solar PV industry to be 
“in play,” or cost-competitive with grid-supplied electricity.18 The 
Disruptive Challenges report cites a projected 22 percent compound 
annual growth rate in installation of solar PV panels through 2020, which 
would give DG resources about 10 percent of the capacity in certain 
markets.19 
A more recent analysis by the Department of Energy described cost 
reductions of 6-7% per year from 1998-2013 for residential and 
commercial PV systems, and 12-15% from 2012 to 2013.20 Based on 
current pricing trends, the “all-in” costs of distributed solar PV systems 
are expected to range between $1.50 per watt and $3.00 per watt by 2016.21 
One consulting firm estimated that continued growth in DG resources and 
investments in energy efficiency could result in up $48 billion in reduced 
revenue for utilities in the U.S. by 2025.22 The percentage of utility 
executives concerned about the impacts of DG resources causing significant 
or moderate reductions in future utility revenue streams increased from 
 
fueled by natural gas—as is the case for CHP and microturbines—the  cost-competitiveness  is 
enhanced by the currently prevailing low prices for natural gas, which as of December 
2014 are below $4 per MMBtu).  Id. at 5–6.  ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Natural 
Gas Weekly Update (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/weekly/archive/ 
2014/12_18/index.cfm. 
 16.  Id. (citing BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, Solar Module Price Index); 
Id. (Apart from the cost of the solar PV panel itself, there is the cost of installation. 
Disruptive Challenges cites an “all-in” cost of a solar PV installation as approximately $5 per 
watt in 2012). 
 17.  Id. (citing ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, Electricity Data Overview). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id at 5. 
 20.  FELDMAN ET AL., U.S. Doe, SunShot, Photovoltaic System Pricing Trends, 
4 (2014 ed. 2014), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/62558.pdf (This represents the 
fourth year of “sharp declines” in the cost of installed solar PV in the U.S.); Christian 
Roselund, U.S. Installed Solar PV Costs Continue to Fall, PV MAG. (Sep. 18, 2014), 
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/us-installed-solar-pv-costs-continue-to-
fall_100016490/#ixzz3Ni5sJCuH. 
 21.  Id. This “all-in” cost compares to the $5 per watt figure cited in Disruptive Challenges 
for 2012. 
 22.  Utilities Face Significant Revenue Losses from Growth of Solar, Storage and 
Energy Efficiency, ACCENTURE (Dec. 8, 2014), http://newsroom.accenture.com/news/ 
utilities-face-significant-revenue-losses-from-growth-of-solar-storage-and-energy-efficiency- 
accenture-research-shows.htm. 
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43 percent in 2013 to 61 percent in 2014.23 According to this report, solar 
PV is already at “grid parity,” or competitive with the cost of grid-
produced power, in many states in the U.S., and can be expected to reach 
parity in most of the remaining states within the next few years.24 
In addition to the declining cost of solar PV installations, the threat is 
exacerbated by public policies favoring renewable resource development. 
These include net metering provisions in effect in 43 states, which require 
utilities to purchase the output from solar PVs at the utility’s retail rate,25 
tax incentives that provide a 30% investment tax credit for various 
renewable resources,26 and time-of-use pricing by utilities, which improve 
the economics of solar PV installation by paying higher prices during 
daylight hours when the panels produce the most electrical output.27 
B.  Climate Change, Utility System Resilience and Lessons                    
Learned from Superstorm Sandy 
Superstorm Sandy represented the worst natural disaster in Con Edison’s 
history,28 resulting in about one-third of Con Edison’s customers—1,115,000 
out of 3.3 million—losing power.29 However, many commercial and 
industrial facilities and educational institutions in the area (including 
Princeton University’s campus in New Jersey and New York University’s 
campus in lower Manhattan) were largely able to maintain operations, due 
to on-site DG facilities, primarily cogeneration or combined heat and 
power (CHP) facilities.30 The experience from Superstorm Sandy 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Net Metering, DSIRE (Jan. 2015), http://www.dsireusa.org/resources/detailed- 
summary-maps/. 
 26.  Federal Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, Residential Renewable 
Energy Tax Credit, DSIRE (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ 
incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US37F&re=1&ee=1. 
 27.  Disruptive Challenges, supra note 4, at 4. 
 28.  Con Edison, Superstorm Sandy, 2013 State of the Company, http://www.conedison. 
com/ehs/2012-sustainability-report/engaging-stakeholders/reliability/superstorm-sandy/ 
index.html#gsc.tab=0. 
 29.  New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case 13-E-0030, Testimony of Electric 
Infrastructure and Operations Panel, at  15,  available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/ 
public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={A3EFED44-5E61-42B6-9348-7AB59B 
AA8CB5}.  
 30.  As noted in the NYS 2100 COMMISSION REPORT, CHP or cogeneration facilities 
were “able to keep the lights on during the hurricane using microgrids.” NYS 2100 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 101. A combined heat and power (CHP) system 
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demonstrates how DG resources can improve the resilience of the 
electrical grid and mitigate the impacts of an outage by enabling critical 
facilities to maintain essential operations.31 If the electrical grid is 
experiencing an outage, DG systems can be configured to “island” from 
the grid, thereby maintaining uninterrupted power supplies to utility 
customers within a “microgrid.”32 That was the experience from Superstorm 
Sandy, where the use of microgrids and DG resources enabled power to 
be provided to pockets of utility customers in the face of widespread 
outages of central power plants and the associated T&D systems.33 
As described above, Con Edison’s January 2013 rate filing included a 
commitment to spend $1 billion over four years to “harden” its system in 
response to the widespread outages experienced during Superstorm 
Sandy.34 In contrast to this “business as usual” approach proposed by Con 
 
is a DG resource that uses an on-site electrical generator, typically fueled by natural 
gas, to provide electricity and thermal energy (usually in the form of steam or water) 
to a single large building or, in the case of a microgrid or district energy system, to a 
campus or group of facilities. After capturing heat that would otherwise be wasted as 
a byproduct of electricity generation, a CHP system converts that heat into useful 
thermal energy for space heating, cooling or other processes. EPA, Combined Heat 
and Power Partnership, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/chp/basic/index.html. 
 31.  Joel E. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and 
the Smart Grid, 7 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 193 (2012) (Distributed energy 
resources “help the electric grid by increasing grid reliability and resilience, making 
the grid less vulnerable to prolonged power failures.”). 
 32.  Microgrids are small distribution systems that can interconnect and 
coordinate a number of DG resources into a network capable of serving all or a portion 
of the energy needs of a cluster of users. NEW YORK STATE ENERGY AND RESEARCH 
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Microgrids: An Assessment of the Value, Opportunities and 
Barriers to Deployment in New York State (2010), available at www.nyserda.ny.gov,  
at S-1. Depending upon their configuration, microgrids can be “islanded” to operate 
independently from the utility grid. NYS 2100 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 
95. (“‘Microgrids’ refers to clusters of homes and buildings that share a local electric 
power generation and/or energy storage device while disconnected from the utility 
grid.”) 
 33.  NYS 2100 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 101. Following Superstorm 
Sandy, the consulting firm ICF International prepared a report highlighting the role of 
DG resources, and CHP facilities in particular, in enhancing the resilience of critical 
infrastructure facilities during the extended power outages caused by Superstorm Sandy. ICF 
INTERNATIONAL, Combined Heat and Power: Enabling Resilient Energy Infrastructure for 
Critical Facilities, Mar. 2013, available at http://www.harc.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ 
projects/CHP%20Critical%20Facilities.pdf, at 4 [hereinafter ICF REPORT]. The ICF 
Report includes fourteen “case studies” where CHP facilities improved system resiliency 
through “mitigating the impacts of an emergency by keeping critical facilities running 
without any interruption in electric or thermal service.” Id. at 4–30. 
 34.  Letter from Craig S. Ivey, President, Con Edison to Jeffrey C. Cohen, Acting 
Secretary, New York PSC, New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Jan. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.coned.com/documents/2013-rate-filings/filing-letter-and-attachments.pdf. The 
measures for storm hardening of critical infrastructure incorporated undergrounding 
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Edison, however, a consortium of environmental groups (NGO Parties) 
proposed a fundamental re-examination of the manner in which electric 
utility service is delivered, with a focus on measures that improve the 
resilience of the grid.35 Rather than relying on traditional methods to 
prepare for the next major storm based on the weaknesses exposed by the 
last one, the NGO Parties urged that the priorities of a utility’s major 
capital expenditures be aligned toward investing in the “utility of the 
future”—a utility designed to withstand the extreme weather events that 
are likely to occur decades into the future.36 
On December 31, 2013, a settlement agreement among most of the 
parties, including the NGO Parties, was submitted to the PSC.37 On 
particular note, the Joint Proposal contains agreements with respect to 
DG issues and the deployment of microgrids within Con Edison’s service 
territory.38 In its February 2014 order adopting the Joint Proposal, the 
PSC directed a fundamental change in the manner in which Con Edison 
plans for future capital investments, and required analysis of alternative 
resilience strategies, including microgrids.39 The Con Edison Order was 
noteworthy in several respects. First, the PSC largely rejected the 
“business as usual” approach offered by Con Edison, which responded to 
 
of some facilities as well as flood protection projects, such as installation of flood 
walls, raising the elevation of critical equipment, and use of submersible equipment, 
id. 
 35.  The “NGO Parties” comprised the Pace Energy and Climate Center (Pace), 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), 
and the Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law (Columbia). New York 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case 13-E-0030, Testimony of Jackson Morris, Pace Energy & 
Climate Center, available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc. 
aspx?DocRefId={81F2C4EB-EE3C-4921-B0F5-C5F4C6E24EF3}, at 5. 
 36.  Id. The National Climate Assessment notes that “U.S. energy facilities and systems, 
especially those located in coastal areas, are vulnerable to extreme weather events.” 
U.S. GLOBAL RESEARCH PROGRAM, Climate Change Impacts in the United States, Chapter 4, 
Energy Supply and Use, available at http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/sectors/ 
energy, at 115. The impacts of extreme weather events “are expected to increase in the 
future.” Id. at 114. 
 37.  See New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case 13-E-0030, Joint Proposal, Dec. 31, 
2013, available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx? 
MatterCaseNo=13-E-0030 [hereinafter Joint Proposal]. 
 38.  Id. at 96–97. 
 39.  Id. at 67–68. The CON EDISON ORDER directed Con Edison to “develop and 
apply a cost/benefit analysis approach for future capital investment that differs from a 
typical utility capital expenditures analysis and assesses the relative benefits of existing 
utility infrastructure and alternative resilience approaches such as microgrids.” 
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Superstorm Sandy by proposing massive, traditional investments in T&D 
infrastructure to “harden” the system against future storms.40 In its place, 
the PSC enunciated a strategy much more focused on improving the 
resilience of the utility grid, which may depart from T&D infrastructure 
investments depending upon the outcome of an innovative cost-benefit 
analysis that Con Edison must apply to its future capital investments.41 
Second, the Con Edison Order, by adopting the Joint Proposal and the 
specific commitments therein, recognized the valuable role that DG 
resources and microgrids can play in improving the resilience of a utility 
system in the face of future extreme weather events.42 The Con Edison 
Order requires Con Edison to take specific steps to pursue integration of 
DG resources in its service territory and to investigate the feasibility of 
microgrid installations.43 
The Con Edison Order was also noteworthy because the “lessons 
learned” from Superstorm Sandy triggered a more fundamental evaluation 
of the utility business model. Within two months of issuing its order in the 
Con Edison rate proceeding, the New York PSC commenced the REV 
proceeding, which was geared toward examining electric utility practices 
in light of the trends in the generation and distribution of electricity and 
technological advances in managing information.44 Given these changes, 
the PSC perceived a need to align its regulatory paradigm with the new 
dynamics in the electric utility industry.45 Section III.A. below describes 
the REV proceeding. 
C.  Other Drivers 
In addition to declining costs of DG resources and climate change/
system resilience objectives, a number of other drivers contribute to the 
perceived need to re-examine the utility business model. These include 
declining electricity sales due to increased investment in energy efficiency 
measures and participation in demand response (DR) programs by retail 
customers;46 the cost pressures faced by electric utilities given their need 
 
 40.  CON EDISON ORDER, supra note 8, at 24. 
 41.  Id. at 67–68. 
 42.  Id. at 70. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  REV ORDER, supra note 12. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Disruptive Challenges, or example, notes that energy efficiency and DSM 
programs not only result in reduced utility revenues, but also burden the utility with 
implementation costs of energy efficiency and DSM programs. See Disruptive Challenges, 
supra note 4, at 3. Demand response programs reward customers for being able to 
reduce their electricity use when requested by the utility, usually during periods of 
high power prices or when the reliability of the grid is threatened. 
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to replace aging generation and delivery infrastructure;47 technological 
developments in information systems, which enhances the capability of 
retail electric customers to manage their energy usage;48 heightened 
demands by customers for a high quality (i.e., uninterrupted) electricity 
supply;49 the tools given to both utilities and retail customers to respond 
to increased volatility in electricity prices;50 and the pursuit of public policy 
objectives geared toward reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 
mitigate the impact of climate change.51 
III.  CURRENT PROCEEDINGS EXAMINING THE UTILITY 2.0                        
BUSINESS MODEL 
A.  New York’s REV Proceeding 
In its April 2014 order instituting the REV proceeding, the New York 
PSC indicated its intention to consider “fundamental changes in the 
manner in which utilities provide service” and the possibility of  a 
“substantial transformation” of the utility business model.52 A key 
question to be addressed would focus on the role of the incumbent retail 
electric utility in a system geared toward integration of DG resources and 
customer-centered load management practices, with the goal of achieving 
 
 47.  REV ORDER, supra note 12, Att. 1 at 2. In the REV proceeding, DPS Staff 
estimated that $30 billion would be spent on utility delivery and central generation 
infrastructure over the next ten years. See REV Collaborative Meeting Presentation, 
Reforming the Energy Vision (REV), (May 12, 2014), available at http://www3.dps. 
ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/96f0fec0b45a3c6485257688006a701a/26be8a93967e6047852 
57cc40066b91a/$FILE/REV%205.12.14%20Collaborative%20Meeting.pdf, at 3. 
 48.  The PSC noted the technological developments that have made it more feasible to 
deploy alternative methods to manage and satisfy retail customer loads. These developments 
include advances in telecommunications,  controls for industrial systems, and DG resources, 
id. at 3–4. Investments in smart grid technology create new opportunities for customers 
to manage their energy use and actively participate in grid operations, such as through 
DR programs. See ADVANCED ENERGY ECONOMY, Creating a 21st Century Electricity 
System for New York State, An Energy Industry Working Group Position Paper, available at 
https://www.aee.net/initiatives/21st-century-electricity-system.html#ny-state-energy-
industry-working-group, at 6. 
 49.  REV ORDER, supra note 12, at 2. The PSC referred to the “demands of the 
digital economy,” which have resulted in greater economic costs associated with outages and 
forced customers to consider self-generation as a supplement to grid-supplied power, 
id. at 2–3. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 4–5. 
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greater efficiencies in the system.53 The PSC identified six policy objectives 
to guide the proceeding: providing better information and more tools to 
customers to manage their energy bills; stimulating the market and 
“leveraging” the contributions from utility ratepayers; improving the 
efficiency of the utility system; achieving greater diversity in energy 
resources; improving the reliability and resilience of the utility grid; and 
reducing GHG emissions.54 Given the “foundational steps” that New York 
has previously taken to encourage the integration of DG resources into the 
utility grid and the presence of a single-state wholesale market (administered 
by the New York ISO), the PSC concluded that New York was “particularly 
well-suited” to take the lead in the examination of possible new utility 
business models.55 The REV Order also recognized the changes in ratemaking 
practices that must accompany any transformation of the utility business 
model.56 
In a Report and Proposal that accompanied the REV Order, the PSC 
Staff articulated a new business model for the electric distribution system 
that identified the foundational utility service as a “distribution system 
platform provider,” or DSP.57 As described in the Report and Proposal, 
this entity would be charged, among other things, with planning and 
designing its distribution system to facilitate a prominent role for DG 
resources in meeting system needs;58 creating markets, tariffs and operations 
systems to facilitate integration of “behind-the-meter” resource providers, 
such as energy efficiency and DR programs, building management systems, 
and microgrids;59 providing information technology and real-time pricing 
information among market participants, including pricing structures for 
DG products and services;60 serving as the primary interface among retail 
customers in distribution markets and between retail customers and the 
wholesale markets (i.e., aggregating products for purpose of offering them 
to the New York ISO);61 serving as the local balancing authority (i.e., 
balancing loads and resources to meet customer needs and maintain 
reliability);62 and developing communications networks capable of 
supporting a smart grid.63 
 
 53.  Id. at 2. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 4. 
 56.  Id. at 4–5. 
 57.  Id. at 6. 
 58.  Id. at Att. 1, at 12. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 12, 20. 
 61.  REV ORDER, supra note 12, Att. 1, at 12. 
 62.  Id. at 22. 
 63.  Id. at 23. 
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The REV Order established two parallel tracks for the proceeding—one 
to examine the utility business model, and the second to examine the 
regulatory framework and ratemaking issues.64 The proceeding attracted 
an unprecedented number of parties—259 stakeholders have intervened 
in the case65—as well as considerable national attention.66 One commenter 
referred to REV as a “landmark regulatory proceeding” the outcome of 
which “will reverberate across the country” as other states wrestle with 
the same underlying drivers.67 In addition to the Staff Report and Proposal 
issued with the REV Order, Staff issued its proposal with respect to Track 
One issues on August 22, 2014.68 Staff’s recommendations in the Track 
One Proposal are discussed further in Section IV.B below. The PSC 
issued its order on Track One issues in late February 2015, also discussed 
further below.69 Staff will present its proposal on Track Two issues on 
June 1, 2015.70 
B.  Hawaii PUC’s “Inclinations on the Future of Hawaii’s                         
Electric Utilities” 
Hawaii, with its heavy reliance on oil-fired electric generation, has the 
nation’s highest electricity rates.71 As a result, the threat to the utility 
 
 64.  Id. at 6. 
 65.  TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at 2. 
 66.  See Matthew Wald, State Energy Plan Would Alter New York Utilities, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/nyregion/state-energy-
plan-would-alter-new-york-utilities.html?_r=0; Gargi Chakrebarty, REV It Up in New York, 
ENERGYBIZ, Sept./Oct. 2014, available at http://www.energybiz.com/magazine/article/368385/ 
rev-it-new-york; Stephen Lacy, New York’s Energy Czar: We Need Clean Energy Markets, Not 
Programs or Mandates, GREENTECH GRID, Nov. 24, 2014, available at http://www.green 
techmedia.com/articles/read/new-york-energy-czar-we-need-clean-energy-markets-not-programs. 
 67.  Ryan Katofsky and Lisa Frantzis, Devil is in the Details on NY’s Reforming the 
Energy Vision, ADVANCED ENERGY ECONOMY, Sept. 11, 2014, available at http://blog. 
aee.net/devil-is-in-the-details-on-nys-reforming-the-energy-vision. 
 68.  TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 13. 
 69.  New York Pub Serv Comm’n, Case 14-M-0101, Order Adopting Regulatory 
Policy Framework and Implementation Plan , Feb. 26, 2015, available at http:// 
documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-m- 
0101&submit=Search+by+Case+Number [hereinafter TRACK ONE ORDER]. 
 70.  Id. at 131. 
 71.  Davide Savenije and Claire Cameron, Hawaii’s Overhaul of the Utility Business 
Model, UTILITY DIVE, May 7, 2014, available at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/hawaii-
provides-us-utilities-a-glimpse-of-the-future/272824/.  The HECO Companies comprise 
Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc., and Maui Electric 
Company, Ltd. 
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business model posed by DG resources is more urgent for Hawaii’s 
electric utilities.72 A report from the Rocky Mountain Institute concluded 
that the economics of “grid defection”—the ability to drop off the 
traditional utility grid using distributed solar generation and storage—are 
already tilting in favor of electricity customers in Hawaii.73 According to 
the report, because of the high retail electricity prices in Hawaii, it is 
already cost-effective for a commercial customer in Honolulu to drop off 
the grid with a solar-plus-battery installation and a standby diesel generator.74 
Another driver for renewable energy in Hawaii is its fairly aggressive 
renewable portfolio standard, with an obligation to achieve 40% renewable 
energy by 2030.75 The state already met its 2015 renewables target of 
15%,76 and renewables met more than 18% of HECO Companies’ customers’ 
energy needs in 2013.77 There are 43,000 PV systems in the area served 
by the HECO Companies, up from 850 PV systems in 2008.78 
The Hawaii PUC started examining “the utility of the future” in 
May 2013, with its order in a general rate proceeding involving Maui 
Electric Company, one of the HECO Companies.79 In an exhibit to the 
rate order, the PUC offered “observations and perspectives” to address 
“fundamental, emerging issues” facing investor-owned electric utilities in 
Hawaii.80 The PUC observed that the HECO Companies (one of which is 
Maui Electric) “appear to lack movement to a sustainable business model 
to address technological advancements and increasing customer 
expectations.”81 One year later, the Hawaii PUC rejected the HECO 
 
 72.  Id. (stating that Hawaiian Electric Company, the state’s biggest electric utility, 
has an avoided cost of generation of $0.22697/kWh, which is almost fifty percent higher 
than the average levelized price of utility-scale solar ($0.15576/kWh). 
 73.  ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, HOMER ENERGY AND COHNREZNICK THINK 
ENERGY, THE ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION, 37 (FEB. 2014), http://www.rmi.org/electricity 
_grid_defection. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Renewable Portfolio Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/ 
program/detail/606 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 76.  Savenije & Cameron, supra note 71. 
 77.  Davide Savenije, Hawaii Provides U.S. Utilities a Glimpse of the Future, 
UTILITY DIVE (June 11, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/hawaii-provides-us-utilities-
a-glimpse-of-the-future/272824/. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Maui Elec. Co., Ltd., Docket No. 2011-0092, Order No. 31288, Haw. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n (May 31, 2013), http://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/OpenDocServlet?RT=&document 
_id=91+3+ICM4+LSDB15+PC_DocketReport59+26+A1001001A13F03B43854C1206
218+A13F03B43854C120621+14+1960. In its decision, the Hawaii PUC ordered a rate 
reduction of $7.7 million (resulting in a refund of over $8 million) and reduced Maui 
Electric’s return on equity from 10% to 9%, with half of that reduction attributed to 
inefficiencies found in the utility’s operations, id. at 107, 140. 
 80.  Id. at Ex. C1. 
 81.  Id. at 3. 
VAN NOSTRAND(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  3:19 PM 
[VOL. 6:  149, 2014–15]  Getting to Utility 2.0 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 163 
Companies’ integrated resource plan, finding an absence of such a correction 
or any evidence of progress by the utility on “developing and  
implementing a sustainable business model.”82 In Exhibit A to the IRP 
Order, the PUC delivered its Inclinations on the Future of Hawaii’s 
Electric Utilities, which essentially outlined its guidance for the HECO 
Companies in developing that sustainable business model.83 
More broadly, however, the Inclinations document represents the 
PUC’s response to what it perceives as the rapidly evolving nature of the 
electric utility business.84 The PUC enunciated a goal of developing a “21st 
Century Generation System” that would more easily integrate clean 
energy resources to displace current reliance on expensive oil-fired 
generation.85 A second element of the Inclinations document addressed 
the development of a modern electric grid. On this point, the emphasis 
was placed on the seamless integration of DG resources, and providing 
customers with the information necessary to make wise energy choices.86 
With respect to distribution system infrastructure, the PUC noted the 
recent exponential growth in rooftop solar PV systems, and required the 
development of a distributed generation interconnection plan that would 
include, among other things, a discussion of how the utility will manage 
an integrated portfolio of DG resources to optimize the system and 
maximize customer benefits.87 The final element of the Inclinations 
document addresses the policy and regulatory reforms necessary to 
facilitate a clean energy future for Hawaii. The PUC observed that the role 
of the utility is evolving to become more of a “network systems integrator 
and operator,” with consumers taking on the role of “prosumers”—
customers who both consume and use utility services and may also provide 
 
 82.  Maui Elec. Co., Ltd., Docket No. 2012-0036, Order No. 32052, Exhibit A: 
Commission’s Inclinations on the Future of Hawaii’s Electric Utilities 2 (Apr. 28, 2014), 
available at http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Decision-and-Order-No.-
32052.pdf [hereinafter Inclinations]. Integrated resource planning is a process whereby 
utilities examine their resource options, both supply-side and demand-side, over the long 
term—usually twenty years—and then develop a series of short-term actions to implement 
the plan. RACHEL WILSON & PAUL PETERSON, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., A BRIEF SURVEY 
OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING RULES AND REQUIREMENTS 3,7, 9 (2011), 
available at http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ACSF_IRP-Survey_ 
Final_2011-04-28.pdf. 
 83.  Inclinations, supra note 82, at 1. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id at 3. 
 86.  Id. at 3, 10. 
 87.  Id. at 15. 
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services to the utility.88 Over time, the PUC saw HECO Companies’ role as 
an “independent” power supply integrator and operator of the electric grid 
in Hawaii, much like the role performed by regional transmission 
organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) in the 
wholesale electricity markets.89 
In an order issued on the same day as the IRP Order, the Hawaii PUC 
required the HECO Companies to file action plans to address the issues 
identified in the IRP Order and the Inclinations document.90 In an unrelated 
matter, NextEra Energy, based in June Beach, Florida, announced on 
December 3, 2014 that it was paying $4.3 billion (and assuming $1.7 
billion in debt) to acquire the HECO Companies.91 The announcement of 
the acquisition of the HECO Companies will complicate the PUC’s 
evaluation of HECO Companies’ August 2014 filings. As a practical matter, 
the implementation of the energy future envisioned by the PUC in its 
Inclinations document will likely be explored thoroughly in the merger 
proceeding. Given the background and experience of NextEra Energy 
Resources in renewable energy, the merger proceeding can be expected to 
focus on the pace at which the HECO Companies plan to implement the 
“sustainable business model,” including integrating substantial additional 
renewable resources. 
C.  California’s Distribution Resource Plans 
In 2013, the California legislature passed AB 327, which includes 
major changes to the state’s energy policies.92 Among other things, 
 
 88.  Id. at 3, 16. 
 89.  Id. at 20. 
 90.  Proceeding to Review Haw. Elec. Co., Inc., & Maui Elec. Co., Ltd.’s Demand-
Side Management Reports & Requests for Program Modifications, Haw. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, Docket No. 2007-0341, Order No. 32054 (Apr. 28, 2014). On August 26, 2014, 
the HECO Companies filed a power supply improvement plan, a distribution generation 
interconnection plan, and an integrated interconnection queue proposal. Press Release, 
Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n, PUC Receives the HECO Companies, Action Plans to Achieve 
State Energy Goals, 1–2 (Aug. 26, 2014) (on file with author). The PUC is in the process 
of evaluating the filings to determine whether they comply with its April orders and the 
state’s energy goals, id. at 2. 
 91.  Press Release, NextEra Energy & Haw. Elec. Indus. to Combine, 4 (Dec. 3, 
2014) (on file with authors) (providing the transaction must be approved by the Hawaii 
PUC and HEI shareholders and is expected to be completed by December 2015). 
 92.  2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Assem. B. No. 327, ch. 611 (West). 
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AB 327 addresses net metering,93 the state’s renewable portfolio standard,94 
natural gas and electricity rates,95 and electricity resources.96 Of particular 
relevance to this article is AB 327’s addition of Section 769 to the public 
utilities code.97 Section 769 relates to electric distribution planning by the 
state’s investor-owned utilities, and requires each of the utilities to submit 
distribution resource plans (DRPs) to the California PUC by July 1, 2015.98 
The statute defines “distributed resources” broadly to include renewable 
DG resources, as well as energy efficiency, energy storage, electric vehicle, 
and demand response.99 California’s three major utilities—Pacific Gas & 
Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas & Electric—
spend about $6 billion per year on investments in the distribution grid, but 
current distribution planning efforts fail to take into account the role that 
distributed resources could have in reducing costs for utility customers.100 
Maximizing the value of these resource additions to the grid is particularly 
important given that as much as 15 gigawatts of distributed resources 
could come on line in California before the end of this decade, including 
12 gigawatts of distributed solar, 1 gigawatt of grid-scale energy storage, 
and 1 gigawatt of demand response.101 
 
 93.  Id. Net Metering allows electricity customers generating their own electricity 
(e.g., solar panels) to use any excess electricity to offset electricity that the customer would 
otherwise have to purchase from the utility at the retail rate. Glossary, DSIRE, http:// 
programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/40. 
 94.  Assemb. B. 327, supra note 92 (authorizing CPUC to require utilities procure 
renewable energy resources in excess of the stated requirements); Glossary, supra note 93 
(“Renewable portfolio stanards (RPSs) require utilities to use or procure renewable energy 
or renewable energy credits (RECs) to account for a certain percentage of their retail 
electricity sales—or a certain amount of generating capacity—according to a specified 
schedule.”). 
 95.  Assemb. B. 327, supra note 92 (amending the California Alternative Rates for 
Energy (CARE) program, which provides lower rates to low-income customers); CAL. 
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 739.1 (2014). 
 96.  Assemb. B. 327, supra note 92. 
 97.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769 (2014). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769(a) (2014). 
 100.  Jeff St. John, California Takes Its First Step Toward Creating the Distributed, 
Intelligent Grid of the Future, GREENTECHMEDIA (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/ 
articles/read/california-takes-its-first-step-toward-a-distributed-grid-future. 
 101.  Id.; Craig Lewis, It’s Time for Grid Planners to Put Distributed Resources on 
Par with Transmission, GREENTECHMEDIA, (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia. 
com/articles/read/its-time-for-grid-planners-to-put-distributed-resources-on-par-with-transmi 
(providing In addition to maximizing the value of distributed resources for utility customers, 
taking these resources into account in distribution planning can also avoid potential stranded 
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The purpose of the DRP process is to require the utilities to identify 
“optimal locations” to deploy distributed resources,102 with a goal of 
achieving full integration of these resources into utilities’  distribution 
planning operations and investments.103 In developing their DRPs, 
utilities must evaluate the benefits and costs of distributed resources by 
location and incorporate various factors.104 These factors include the need 
for local generation capacity; whether the particular location for the 
distributed resource will reduce or increase investments in the distribution 
infrastructure; any safety or reliability benefits; and any other savings that 
might accrue, either to ratepayers or the electric grid, as a  result of 
deployment of the distributed resource.105 The utilities must then develop 
standard tariffs, contracts or other arrangements that promote the deployment 
of cost-effective distributed resources in a manner consistent with these 
distribution planning objectives.106 In their DRPs, the utilities are required 
to develop a combination of existing programs, incentives and tariff 
provisions to deploy distributed resources where they have the most value 
and to minimize the costs of these resources.107 Finally, Section 769 
acknowledges that additional utility spending may be necessary to 
integrate distributed resources into the distribution planning process, and 
the DRP must identify such additional costs, consistent with providing net 
benefits to utility customers.108 
In August 2014, the California PUC initiated a rulemaking for the 
purposes of establishing policies and procedures to guide the utilities in 
developing their DRPs.109 Under the schedule for the proceeding, the PUC 
expects to issue its ruling with final guidance for development of DRP 
proposals in late January 2015.110 As noted above, Section 769 requires 
each utility to file its DRP by July 1, 2015, with PUC approval expected 
in March 2016.111 
 
costs in the future if utilities continue to make traditional investments in central generation 
and transmission infrastructure, which could become prematurely obsolete as a result of 
distributed resources). 
 102.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769(b) (2014). 
 103.  Order Instituting Rule Making Regarding Policies, Procedures and Rules for 
Development of Distribution Resources Plans Pursuant to Public Utilities Code Section 
769, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n 4, available at http://energystorage.org/system/files/resources/ 
102036703.pdf. 
 104.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769(b)(1) (2014). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769(b)(2) (2014). 
 107.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769(b)(3) (2014). 
 108.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 769(b)(4) (2014). 
 109.  See Order Instituting Rulemaking, supra note 103. 
 110.  Id. at 10. 
 111.  Id. Another relevant development in California is the requirement imposed by 
the PUC that the state’s three investor-owned utilities procure 1,325 MW of energy 
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D.  Massachusetts’s “Grid Modernization” Proceeding 
In June 2014, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) 
issued two orders that address its vision for a new energy future. The first, 
involving modernization of the electric grid, outlines four objectives for 
modernizing the electric grid and promoting new technologies, with a goal 
toward creating a “modern electric system” that is “cleaner, more efficient 
and reliable, and will empower customers to manage and reduce their 
energy costs.”112 The objectives are (1) reducing the effects of outages, 
(2) optimizing demand through reducing peak demand (by enabling 
customers to respond to price signals) and promoting end-use efficiency, 
(3) integrating distributed resources (including renewable energy 
resources, microgrids, electric vehicles, and energy storage), and 
(4) improving workforce and asset management.113 The order directs 
Massachusetts utilities to file 10-year grid modernization plans within 
nine months.114 These plans must identify how the utilities propose to 
make measurable progress towards achieving the identified grid 
modernization objectives.115 
The second order, involving time-of-use rates, requires Massachusetts’s 
utilities to switch their default pricing plan from flat rates to time-variable 
 
storage. As a result of these activities, California received the highest score (along with 
Texas) in the 2014 Grid Modernization Index, as calculated by the GridWise Alliance and 
the Smart Grid Policy Center. GRIDWISE ALLIANCE/SMART GRID ALLIANCE CENTER, 2014 
Grid Modernization Index, Nov. 17, 2014, http://www.gridwise.org/. This index attempts 
to rank and analyze the states with respect to their progress in moving toward modernized 
electric “Grid of the Future.” Id. at V. Part of this analysis involves necessary changes in 
the “business structure and operating mindset” of electric utilities to become more service-
oriented rather than mere commodity suppliers.  Id. 
 112.  Investigation by the Dep’t of Pub. Util. on its own Motion into Modernization 
of the Electric Grid, Mass. D.P.U. 12-76-B (June 12, 2014). 
 113.  Id. at 2. 
 114.  Id. at 5. 
 115.  Id. at 2. In addition, the utilities are required to submit a five-year short-term 
investment plan detailing the proposed capital investments, id. at 3. Investments identified 
in this short-term plan are eligible for pre-authorization, which gives the utilities assurances that 
the decision to proceed with the projects will not subsequently be challenged by the D.P.U.. 
Id. at 3–4. To provide additional incentive for such investments, the order adopts a capital 
expenditure tracking mechanism for cost recovery of the incremental capital investments 
identified in the short-term plan.  Id. at 4. Through use of a tracking mechanism, the utilities 
achieve quicker rate recovery of the capital costs, which reduces the risks associated with 
grid modernization investments. Id. 
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and critical peak pricing plans.116 Of more relevance to issues associated 
with the “utility of the future,” time-varying rates also provide incentives 
—through stronger price signals—for DG resources such as solar PV, as 
well as for electricity storage, electric vehicles, energy efficiency and 
demand response.117 Although one observer described these orders as part 
of the “pathway to the so-called utility 2.0,” another observer noted that 
Massachusetts is not seeking to “reinvent” its utilities through these 
orders, but simply to address the issue of reducing peak demand.118 
E.  Maryland’s Utility 2.0 Project 
In July 2012, then-Governor Martin O’Malley signed an Executive 
Order commencing a process to explore improving the resiliency and 
reliability of Maryland’s electric distribution system.119 The Executive 
Order cited numerous extreme weather events (including hurricanes, 
blizzards, and derechos) and the likelihood that, due to climate change, 
the state would continue to suffer “violent weather patterns” in the future.120 
That process culminated in the Report of the Grid Resiliency Task Force 
in September 2012 which, among other things, included a recommendation 
to develop a “Utility 2.0” pilot proposal as a “viable method to explore the 
contours of the utility of the future.”121 The Task Force Report observed that 
the “utility industry was transforming at a pace unseen in its history,” 
driven by breakthroughs in technology, improved analytics regarding 
 
 116.  Investigation by the Dep’t  of Pub. Util. upon its own Motion into Time Varying 
Rates, Mass. D.P.U. 14-04-B, at 8 (June 12, 2014). Under the plan, customers would pay 
three different prices for electricity depending on whether they are using power on-peak, 
off-peak, or during critical peak demand periods (when wholesale prices are extremely 
high), id. at 8-9. Customers who prefer a flat rate plan will have such option in their basic 
service, but will still be eligible for peak demand rebates if they reduce their electricity 
usage during times when wholesale hourly energy prices are the highest. Id. at 10. 
According to the DPU, time-varying rates will allow customers to respond to the actual 
variances in the price of electricity, which will enable individual customers to save money 
by altering usage and benefit all customers through reducing peak energy and capacity 
costs.  Id. at 1. 
 117.  Id. at 1. 
 118.  Claire Cameron, Inside Massachusetts’ Ambitious Plans to Modernize the Grid, 
UTILITY DIVE (Jun. 27, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/inside-massachusetts-
ambitious-plans-to-modernize-the-grid/279535/. 
 119.  GEN. ASSEMB. OF MD., DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERV., IMPROVING THE RESILIENCY OF 
MARYLAND’S ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, EXEC. ORDER 01.01.2012.15, at 51 (2012), 
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/Pubs/LegisLegal/2012-executive-orders.pdf. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  OFFICE OF GOVERNOR MARTIN O’MALLEY, WEATHERING THE STORM: REPORT 
OF THE GRID RESILIENCY TASK FORCE 89 (2012), available at http://msa.maryland.gov/ 
megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/015000/015223/unrestricted/20121059e.pdf. 
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energy usage, and new options for communications with customers.122 At 
the same time, utilities are expected to adapt to various policy objectives, 
including expansion of renewable energy sources, decreases in energy 
usage, and reductions in GHG emissions.123 Given this “transformative 
time in Maryland’s energy future,” the Task Force urged the use of a pilot 
to explore the transition of the electric utility industry into a “Utility 2.0” 
model, and further recommended development of a formal proposal for 
the “utility of the future.”124 
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Task Force, the Energy Future 
Coalition in October 2012 assumed the task of creating the “Utility 2.0” 
model for Maryland.125 In March 2013, the Coalition issued the Maryland 
Utility 2.0 Report. The report was issued, and offered a “pilot project design” 
with six attributes for the electric utility of the future: (1) align utility 
incentives with customers’ needs through performance parameters (and 
adjustments to the utility’s return on equity) based on cost, reliability of 
customer service, adoption of smart grid technologies, and support for 
alternative energy;126 (2) support for utility investment in smart-grid 
technologies to improve optionality for customers;127 (3) on-bill financing 
by the utility to enable customers to finance energy efficiency measures;128 
(4) utility system upgrades to facilitate microgrids;129 (5) facilitating deployment 
of electric vehicles;130 and (6) necessary changes to the regulatory model to 
ensure that utilities remain financially viable even though less electricity 
is delivered.131 The report acknowledged that the pilot “anticipates a 
significant change in the business model for Maryland’s utilities,” thereby 
requiring a number of “parallel changes” in the regulatory framework.132 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  STAFF OF THE ENERGY FUTURE COAL., UTILITY 2.0 PILOTING THE FUTURE FOR 
MARYLAND’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND THEIR CUSTOMERS (2013), available at http://clean 
energytransmission.org/uploads/Utility%202-0%20Pilot%20Project-reduced.pdf. 
 126.  Id. at 2. 
 127.  Id. at 2–3. 
 128.  Id. at 3. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 4. 
 131.  Id. at 1, 36. 
 132.  Id. at 36. The Maryland PSC, for example, would have to develop metrics for 
the performance parameters in order to implement the incentives.  Id.  PSC approval would 
also be required for the on-bill financing, utility investments in smart-grid technology, as 
well as regulatory changes to accommodate microgrids.  Id. at 36–37. 
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In February 2014, then-Governor O’Malley established a separate task 
force to examine the grid resiliency that could be achieved through 
microgrids.133  In June 2014, the Maryland Resiliency Through Microgrids 
Task Force Report was issued, and contained a number of recommendations 
regarding deployment of microgrids in Maryland.134 The report identified 
“public purpose microgrids,” which serve critical community assets that 
could provide broad public benefits when the utility grid is experiencing 
an outage.135 In the short-term, the report recommended that Maryland 
focus on utility-owned public purpose microgrids through advocacy and 
incentives, with long-term efforts focused on reducing barriers to entry 
for third parties (i.e., non-utilities, such as local governments or private 
developers) to be able to offer microgrid services.136 The Task Force 
concluded that allowing competition for microgrid services would 
encourage innovation, provide increased resilience and reliability of 
electric service, and still allow utilities to operate under “this new business 
model.”137 
F.  Minnesota’s “e21 Initiative” 
In Minnesota, the Great Plains Institute is commencing an unofficial 
process—the “e21 Initiative”—to explore a new regulatory framework that 
is intended to align utility and customer interests, regulatory incentives, 
and rates with state policies promoting renewable energy and a low-carbon 
future.138 As part of the process, the e21 Initiative is convening a broad 
group of stakeholders including utilities (Xcel Energy and Minnesota Power), 
an academic institution (George Washington University Law School), an 
NGO (Center for Energy and Environment), a Minnesota PUC commissioner, 
and other regulatory observers.139 Phase I of the process will focus on 
alignment of business strategies, regulatory incentives and rates, while 
Phase II will examine the statutory and regulatory framework.140 Phase III 
will involve implementation of the business model and regulatory 
framework.141 Among the goals of the new regulatory framework is the 
 
 133.  MD. ENERGY ADMIN, MARYLAND RESILIENCY THROUGH MICROGRIDS TASK FORCE 
REPORT i (2014), available at http://energy.maryland.gov/documents/MarylandResiliency 
ThroughMicrogridsTaskForceReport_000.pdf. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at i–ii. 
 137.  Id. at ii. 
 138.  e21 Initiative, GREAT PLAINS INSTITUTE, http://www.betterenergy.org/projects/ 
e21-initiative. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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development of a viable utility business model that supports integration 
of DG resources, energy efficiency and advanced energy technology while 
still providing reasonable rates of returns for utilities.142 Another goal of 
the initiative is to align utility and customer interests as Minnesota pursues 
a goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 80% by 2050.143 
IV.  POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL 
As discussed in the following sections, state regulators may consider a 
number of possible structures for the utility business model in responding 
to these changing dynamics in the retail electric utility industry. One 
approach, described as “business as usual,” modifies utility rate structures  
in an attempt to protect the utility’s existing business model.144 
Another approach, adopted by the New York PSC in its REV proceeding, 
is to move toward a business model where the foundational utility service 
is that of a distribution system platform provider, or DSP, which would 
take the utility out of the business of producing energy and providing 
demand-side services in favor of facilitating those functions being 
provided by third parties.145 Adopting a DSP model raises the further question 
of deciding whether the incumbent utility will become the DSP, and how 
the “market power” issues associated with that function can be addressed. 
The sections that follow present three possible approaches to reduce or 
eliminate the market power of the incumbent utility: functional unbundling, 
under which DSP functions are separated without formal changes in legal 
ownership or corporate structure;146 ownership unbundling, under which 
a separate legal entity is formed that would own and operate the distribution 
system;147 or creating an independent, third-party DSP that would operate 
the distribution system while leaving the ownership of the network in the 
hands of the incumbent utility.148 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 145.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 146.  See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 147.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 148.  See infra Section IV.B.3. 
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A.  “Business as Usual” 
One approach available to regulators is to realign utility rates in an 
attempt to protect the existing business model. The rate filings of three 
investor-owned utilities in Wisconsin best illustrate this approach. The 
utilities sought to modify the structure of their rates in response to the 
increasing threat posed by DG resources (solar PV in particular).149 All 
three utilities proposed an increase to the customer (or basic) charge 
component of the utility bill to recover a higher percentage of fixed 
costs.150 We Energies proposed an increase in the customer charge from 
$9 to $16 per month—a 78% increase—while Madison Gas & Electric 
and Wisconsin Public Service proposed increases of 81% and 140%, 
respectively, in the customer charge portion of the bill.151 
In decisions issued in November 2014, the Wisconsin Public Service 
Commission (PSC) largely approved the requested increases in customer 
charges. Wisconsin Public Service was authorized to increase its monthly 
 
 149.  Jeffrey Tomich, Wis. Emerging as Next Battleground in Debate over Future of 
Solar, ENERGYWIRE, July 24, 2014. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Jeffrey Tomich, Wis. Utilities, Opponents Unwilling to Back Down in Rate 
Disputes, ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 8, 2014). We Energies, the state’s largest utility with 1.1 
million customers, also proposed to (1) make net metering tariffs less profitable for self-
generators, (2) deny net metering for customers who lease solar systems, and (3) impose 
a demand charge for customers that self-generate. Tomich, supra, note 149; Understanding 
Your Electricity Charges, PACIFIC POWER, https://www.pacificpower.net/bus/ayu/uyec. 
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015)). (“Sometimes called a power charge, demand charge is 
measured in kilowatts (kw).This is a measurement of capacity or the rate at which you use  
energy. Demand represents the greatest amount of energy used in 15-minute intervals 
during a billing cycle. To measure demand, electric meters record the average demand 
usage over each 15-minute period and record the highest (peak) period for the month.”). 
In proposing the changes in rate structure, We Energies claimed that existing rates for DG 
resources prevent it from fully recovering its fixed costs, inasmuch as a majority of the 
fixed costs are recovered through energy, or commodity rates. Tomich, supra, note 149. 
As an example, Wisconsin Public Service claimed that its fixed costs of providing service 
to residential customers was $66 per month, as compared to its proposed $19 per month 
customer charge. As a result, the fixed costs not recovered through the customer charge 
are allocated to energy charges and, when DG customers use less energy as a result of 
solar generation, the utility may fail to recover the fixed costs associated with serving that 
customer. Jeffrey Tomich, Wis. PSC Makes Statement with Fixed-Charge Decision, 
ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 10, 2014). The solar industry views the proposed demand charge as a 
“tax” on solar that substantially reduces the profitability of solar panels. Tomich, supra 
note 149. One observer claimed that the proposed demand charge represented a 30% reduction to 
the return on a typical 6-kilowatt residential solar system, id. One representative from the solar 
industry referred to the We Energies rate proposals as “the most punitive anti-solar rules 
that would exist anywhere in the country.” Tomich, supra note 149. 
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customer charge from $9 to $19, an increase of 111%.152 The PSC also 
approved We Energies’ requested increase from $9 to $16 per month, an 
increase of 78%, although it rejected the proposal to bar net metering 
customers from leasing their solar panels.153 In the case of Madison Gas 
& Electric, the PSC approved an 82% increase in the monthly customer 
charge, from $10.44 to $19.154 In the case of all three utilities, the increase 
in customer charges was accompanied by slight decreases in the energy 
charges.155 
Increasing the customer charge portion of the bill and adding a demand 
charge component to the bill are legitimate tools that utilities can use to 
attempt to reduce the extent to which fixed costs are recovered through 
energy charges. When fixed costs are recovered through energy charges, 
the utility may generate insufficient revenue to cover these costs if 
customers use less energy, whether as a result of investments in energy 
efficiency measures or customer-sited DG resources.156 A disadvantage of 
increasing the customer charge, however, is the disproportionate impact 
on small users, such as apartment dwellers and the elderly, who will face 
substantial increases in their monthly bills.157 Increasing customer charges 
 
 152.  Jeffrey Tomich, Wis. PSC Makes Statement with Fixed-Charge Decision, 
ENERGYWIRE, (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/11/10/stories/106 
0008631. 
 153.  Thomas Content, Regulators Agree to Increase Fixed Charge on We Energies 
Electric Bills, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014), available at http://www. 
jsonline.com/business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-rate-hike-plan-b9939076 
5z1-282726581.html. 
 154.  Thomas Content, Regulators Approve Higher Fixed Charges on Madison Gas 
& Electric Customers, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Nov. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.jsonline.com/business/regulators-approve-higher-fixed-charges-on-madison-
gas—electric-customers-b99398472z1-284004991.html. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Ben Foster et al., The 2012 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard, AM. COUNCIL 
FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON. (Oct. 2012), available at http://aceee.org/files/pdf/fact-
sheet/e12c-es.pdf (In the case of reduced energy consumption as a result of energy 
efficiency, a ratemaking mechanism, revenue decoupling, is commonly used to address 
the issue of fixed cost recovery for the utility. “Decoupling—the disassociation of a utility’s 
revenue from its sales—makes the utility indifferent to decreases or increases in sales, 
removing what is known as the ‘throughput incentive.’ Although decoupling does not 
necessarily make the utility more likely to promote efficiency programs, it removes the 
disincentive for it to do so.”) 
 157.  Jeffrey Tomich, Wis. Utilities, Opponents Unwilling to Back Down in Rate 
Disputes, ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 8, 2014), available at http://www.eenews.net/energywire/ 
2014/10/08/stories/1060007062 [hereinafter Tomich 2014]. The customer charge component 
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also dampens incentives to use electricity more efficiently and to 
conserve, inasmuch as actions taken to reduce energy usage will have a 
smaller impact on the total bill.158 
Moreover, large energy users will benefit from these changes in rate 
structure, given the corresponding reduction in energy charges.159 Lower 
charges for energy also make investments in DG resources less profitable, 
as they lengthen the payback period for such investments.160 More 
fundamentally, this realignment of utility rates fails to address the long-
term, underlying forces at play in the electric utility industry.161 
B.  Distribution System Platform (DSP) Model 
As noted above, the New York PSC’s April 2014 REV Order 
articulated a new business model for the electric distribution system based 
on the concept of a “distribution system platform provider,” or DSP162 The 
accompanying Staff Report and Proposal identified the functions to be 
performed by the DSP, as discussed above. Apart from this redefinition 
of the basic utility function as a DSP, a more fundamental question is 
determining which entity should perform this DSP function, and the 
necessary regulatory parameters to ensure that the distribution system 
platform is operated in a manner that achieves the public policy objectives 
of, among other things, redesigning the distribution system to take full 
advantage of DG resources and energy efficiency, stimulating participation 
and innovation by third parties, and empowering customers to optimize 
their energy usage.163 As described by one industry expert, allowing the 
 
of the bill could be increased substantially and, in the case of small users, this increase is 
not offset by the corresponding reduction in energy charges. 
 158.  Seth Nowak, Some Utilities are Rushing to Raise Fixed Charges. That Would 
Be Bad for the Economy and Your Utility Bill, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY 
EFFICIENT ECONOMY (Dec. 4, 2014), available at http://www.aceee.org/blog/2014/12/some- 
utilities-are-rushing-raise-fixe. With a lower cost per kilowatthour (kWh) consumed, there 
is a weaker price signal to conserve. On this point, the Kansas Corporation found that 
increased fixed charges would result in increased electricity use by 1.1 to 6.8%.  Id. 
 159.  Tomich 2014, supra note 157. 
 160.  Id. A DG resource (for example, solar panel) essentially displaces electricity 
that would otherwise be provided the utility. If the utility charges a lower price per kWh, 
because more of its costs are recovered through the customer or demand charges, then the 
output from the solar panel becomes less valuable to the customer. In other words, it takes 
longer for the utility customer to recover the cost of the solar panel. 
 161.  As discussed in Section II.A. supra, the cost of solar PV has declined dramatically 
in recent years and the trend towards increased penetration of PV is expected to continue. 
As solar PV costs approach “grid parity” in many parts of the country, customers will 
increasingly reduce their reliance on the utility grid, thereby threatening the utility business 
model to an extent incapable of being protected through changes in rate structures. 
 162.  REV ORDER, supra note 12, at 31. 
 163.  Id. at 2–3. 
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existing distribution utility to continue to operate the distribution platform 
under this new utility business model would present “a strong conflict of 
interest,” given that expanding and optimizing the deployment  of 
customer-owned DG resources and promoting energy efficiency and DR 
programs may have the effect of reducing the need for the utility to make 
additional investments.164 In other words, the utility as DSP would have 
strong motivation to increase its assets—the rate base upon which it earns 
a return—rather than promote customer-owned DG resources.165 
FERC examined similar issues in its restructuring of the electric 
wholesale markets when it issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NOPR) in April 1995 in its “open access” proceeding.166 At the conclusion 
of this rulemaking in 1996, FERC ultimately issued its Order 888, which 
opened up the electric transmission system to competition.167 The objective 
in that proceeding was removing impediments to competition in the 
wholesale power markets; FERC identified “market power through the 
control of transmission” as the “single greatest impediment to competition.”168 
FERC concluded in its Open Access NOPR that transmission service is a 
natural monopoly, and transmitting utilities own the transmission system 
necessary to facilitate bulk power transactions.169 The owner or controller 
of transmission facilities has the ability to exclude generation competitors 
from the market, and thereby favor their own generation.170 The exclusion 
can occur through denial of transmission access, or providing access only 
on rates, terms or conditions of service that are discriminatory.171 Specifically, 
FERC found that: 
 
 164.  Herman Trabish, Utilities Should Not Operate the Distribution Grid, UTILITYDRIVE, 
(Aug 15, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/jon-wellinghoff-utilities-should-not-
operate-the-distribution-grid/298286/ [hereinafter Trabish 2014]. Jon Wellinghoff was 
Chairman of FERC from 2009 to 2013, and is currently a partner in the law firm of Stoel 
Rives LLP. See http://www.stoel.com/jwellinghoff. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  FERC Docket No. RM95-8-000, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through 
Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 
17662-01 (Apr. 7, 1995) [hereinafter OPEN ACCESS NOPR]. 
 167.  Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. (Apr. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 385) [hereinafter ORDER 888]. 
 168.  OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 155, at 17664. 
 169.  Id. at 17665. 
 170.  Id. at 17664–65. 
 171.  Id. at 17665. 
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[U]tilities owning or controlling transmission facilities possess substantial market 
power; that, as profit maximizing firms, they have and will continue to exercise 
that market power in order to maintain and increase market share, and will thus 
deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation; 
and that these unduly discriminatory practices will deny customers the substantial 
benefits of lower electricity prices.172 
The solution, according to FERC, was to require all public utilities owning 
or controlling transmission facilities to offer open, fair and non-discriminatory 
access to the transmission grid.173 
Citing circumstances strikingly similar to today’s situation in the retail 
distribution system, FERC referred to the industry as “in transition,” and 
then in the process of responding to changes in law, technology and 
markets.174 While the move to competitive markets in generation would 
“fundamentally change long-standing regulatory relationships,” FERC 
stated that the transition to competitive bulk power markets would ultimately 
fulfill the Commission’s goal of encouraging lower electricity rates.175 
In the Open Access NOPR and in Order 888, FERC identified three 
possible approaches to address the issue of transmission market power by 
public utilities. The first was functional unbundling, or requiring utilities 
to separate wholesale generation and transmission services without formal 
changes in legal ownership or corporate structure.176 The second was 
ownership unbundling (i.e., requiring separation of transmission functions 
through creation of a separate corporate affiliate, or selling off assets to a 
non-affiliate (divestiture)).177 The third was independent ownership of the 
transmission grid, such as through creation of independent system operators, 
or ISOs, to operate the transmission grid.178 As noted above, the same 
range of options exists today for policymakers to evaluate the “utility 2.0” 
business model, i.e., determining the best approach for addressing the market 
power issues associated with utility operation of the distribution system 
platform, and ensuring nondiscriminatory access to the network for all 
market participants. The following three sections describe these three models, 
and their potential application in the restructuring of the traditional 
distribution utility. 
 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 17663. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  ORDER 888, supra note 167, at 58. 
 177.  Id. at 60; OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 166, at 17681. 
 178.  ORDER 888, supra note 167, at 61. 
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1.  DSP Model with Functional Unbundling 
In its Open Access NOPR and Order 888, FERC determined that functional 
unbundling was necessary to accomplish non-discriminatory open access 
to the transmission system.179 FERC defined functional unbundling to 
have three elements. First, the public utility must take transmission 
services (and related ancillary services, such as scheduling and balancing) 
for its own needs under the same tariff under which others take such 
services.180 In other words, the utility charges itself the same price for 
those services that it charges its wholesale transmission customers.181 The 
second element was a requirement that rates for transmission and ancillary 
services must be unbundled, or separately stated.182 The third element was 
that the utility must rely on the same electronic network as its transmission 
customers when it seeks to obtain information about transmission availability 
for purposes of buying and selling power.183 Apart from these three elements, 
FERC imposed a strong code of conduct regarding communications between 
a utility’s merchant function (buying and selling of power) and transmission 
operations.184 The code of conduct proposed by FERC required that employees 
in transmission system functions be separated from those in wholesale 
marketing functions, and also defined permissible and impermissible contacts 
between these groups of employees.185 
In Order 888, FERC determined that functional unbundling was a 
“reasonable and workable means” of addressing the issue of non-
discriminatory access, and declined to adopt the “more intrusive and 
potentially more costly mechanism” of ownership or corporate unbundling.186 
FERC also rejected “operational unbundling” (the use of a third-party 
independent system operator), although it encouraged utilities to consider 
ISOs “as a tool to meet the demands of a competitive marketplace.”187 As 
 
 179.  OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 166, at 17681; ORDER 888, supra note 167, at 60. 
 180.  OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 166, at 17681. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. ORDER 889, issued April 24, 1996, required an Open Access Same Time 
Information System, or OASIS, to fulfill this third element of functional unbundling. See 
FERC Open Access Same-Time Information System (formerly Real-Time Information 
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 18 C.F.R. § 37 (1996), available at http://www.ferc. 
gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-9-00k.txt. 
 184.  ORDER 888, supra note 167, at 59. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 60. 
 187.  Id. at 60, 61. 
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discussed in a later section of this article, FERC ultimately revisited this 
determination in Order 2000, where it extensively discussed the failures 
of functional unbundling to achieve the desired goals and moved toward 
the ISO model as the best means of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to 
the transmission grid. 
In New York’s REV proceeding, the Department of Public Service staff 
(Staff) endorsed a functional unbundling approach in its “Straw Proposal 
on Track One Issues.”188 As noted above, Staff defined the Distribution 
System Platform, or DSP, model in its April 2014 report.189 In the Track 
One Proposal, Staff recommended that the incumbent distribution utility 
perform the DSP function,190 accompanied by additional measures to 
address “the natural monopoly of distribution system operations” and to 
“prevent the unfair exercise of market power by utilities.”191 Staff concluded 
that there were significant advantages to this structure inasmuch as the 
utilities already bear the responsibility for the important  function of 
maintaining grid reliability, and the regulatory mechanisms are already in 
place for the incumbent utilities, including ratemaking, audits and 
operational review.192 In its Track One Order, the New York PSC agreed 
with Staff’s recommendation, finding that it could be in the “best interests 
of New York consumers” for the utilities to serve as DSPs under the 
regulatory authority and supervision of PSC.193 The PSC indicated that it 
would not engage in functional separation of DSP functions from standard 
utility operations “in a manner that impairs effective performance of the 
integrated functions of utility and DSP or imposes unnecessary costs.194 
With respect to market power, the Track One Proposal cites the utility’s 
“direct commercial market involvement” with distributed energy resources, 
or DER, as a source of market power, given the utility’s control of 
(1) schedule and dispatch of these resources, (2) their ability to interconnect 
with the distribution platform, and (3) their access to system and customer 
data.195 As a result, the utility could erect barriers to the ability of distributed 
energy resources to compete, such as through burdensome interconnection 
 
 188.  TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 13. 
 189.  REV ORDER, supra note 12, Att. 1 at 9. 
 190.  TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at 12. 
 191.  Id. at 18–19. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 69, at 48. The PSC found it unnecessary to 
create an independent DSP, given that the associated investment and operating costs would 
ultimately be passed through to retail customers.  Id. at 50.  According to the TRACK ONE 
ORDER, the PSC saw “no value in adding to consumer burdens by either creating or imposing 
these costs on customers.” Id. 
 194.  Id. at 52. 
 195.  TRACK ON PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at 67. 
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requirements, inadequate tariffs, or denial of access to system or customer 
data.196 The Track One Proposal also refers to the possibility of a 
“functional competitive advantage” of the platform operator, irrespective 
of utility behavior.197 
Addressing these market power concerns, the Track One Proposal 
recommended generally that utilities not be permitted to engage directly 
in ownership of distributed energy resources, unless it is generation or 
storage located on utility distribution property.198 While acknowledging 
that there are advantages to utility involvement in DER—they know the 
needs and capabilities of the distribution system, and can easily identify 
the best sites for locating DER—the Track One Proposal concluded that 
allowing utility participation could have the effect of discouraging private 
capital and potential market participants from investing in New York, 
thereby stifling the possible growth of a competitive and innovative 
market for distributed energy resources.199 The Track One Proposal 
recommended that utilities be permitted to participate directly in 
sponsorship and management of energy efficiency programs.200 Where an 
unregulated utility affiliate seeks to operate within the utility’s service 
territory, codes of conduct would govern the interactions with the regulated 
utility.201 In addition, heightened regulatory scrutiny would monitoring 
interconnection complaints and making ombudsman available for DER 
providers.202 If an affiliate bids into a utility’s procurement for distributed 
energy resources, an independent entity would select the winning bids.203 
Finally, caps on market share would be placed on the extent of affiliate 
participation within the service territory and within individual distribution 
circuits.204 
 
 196.  Id. The New York PSC defined DER to include DG resources as well as end-
use energy efficiency, demand response and distributed storage. TRACK ONE ORDER, supra 
note 69, at 3. 
 197.  TRACK ON PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at 67. 
 198.  Id. at 72. The Track One Proposal would allow direct participation in limited 
circumstances, if part of a utility’s Distributed System Implementation Plans, and upon a 
showing that the proposal addresses a substantial system need, the benefits of utility 
engagement outweigh the market power concerns, and a competitive solicitation is used 
for construction and operation of DG resources.  Id. at 72–73. 
 199.  Id. at 70. 
 200.  Id. at 72. 
 201.  Id. at 73. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
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In its Track One Order, the PSC adopted Staff’s recommendations from 
the Track One Proposal and prohibited utility ownership of distributed 
energy resources where a market participant can and will provide these 
services.205 The PSC modified Staff’s recommendation by narrowing the 
circumstances where it would be permissible for the utility to own distributed 
energy resources. While the Track One Proposal would allow utility 
ownership of energy storage and generation located on utility property, 
the Track One Order found that utility investment should not be permitted 
simply because of its location on any utility property. Rather, the 
exemption from the general rule against utility ownership of DER would 
apply if the resource is “directly integrated into distribution service” and 
is used to “support and enhance reliable system operations.”206 
Section V.B. below will discuss some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the functional unbundling approach relative to other 
possible structures. 
2.  DSP Model with Ownership Unbundling 
As noted above, FERC considered the possibility of ownership unbundling 
for transmission in its Open Access NOPR and Order 888, but ultimately 
adopted a rule requiring functional unbundling rather than “corporate 
unbundling,” or the creation of a separate corporate entity to own and 
operate a utility’s transmission assets.207 While Order 888 accommodates 
ownership unbundling, it does not require it.208 FERC concluded in Order 
888 that ownership unbundling would create inefficiencies and additional 
costs, which was unnecessary given its conclusion that functional unbundling 
would be sufficient to remedy discriminatory practices.209 Order 888 therefore 
rejected ownership unbundling as a “more intrusive and potentially more 
costly mechanism.”210 
 
 205.  TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 69, at 52, 68–70. 
 206.  Id. at 69. 
 207.  OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 166, at 17681. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  ORDER 888, supra note 167, at 54. FERC acknowledged in ORDER 888 that a 
number of commenters strongly advocated for corporate or ownership unbundling. Id. at 
56–58. One commenter noted the affiliate abuses that were occurring in the natural gas 
industry, and claimed that the potential was even greater in the electric industry given the 
domination by vertically integrated utilities. Id. at 56. Another commenter criticized 
functional unbundling as insufficient as it would fail to address the ability of the utility to 
favor its marketing operations when dealing with issues related to transmission planning, 
capital investment, and O&M replacement costs.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 60. 
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Under the ownership unbundling model, the operation of the electricity 
network is effectively separated from generation and retail activities.211 In 
other words, the previously common ownership structure between network 
operations and generation activities of a company are separated, including 
the separation of asset ownership.212 The separate transmission company 
that is created not only operates, but also owns, the transmission network 
assets.213 Generation companies would be precluded from acquiring or 
maintaining transmission networks.214 
An example of an “ownership unbundled” approach for transmission is 
the independent transmission system operator, or ITSO, where one legal 
entity both owns and operates the transmission system.215 One such entity 
is National Grid in the United Kingdom, which owns and operates the 
national transmission network.216  In addition to the system operator in the 
UK, there are three transmission operators charged with developing, 
operating and maintaining the transmission grid within defined regions: 
National Grid Electricity Transmission plc (NGET) in England and Wales, 
Scottish Power Transmission Limited for southern Scotland, and Scottish 
Hydro-Electric Transmission plc for northern Scotland and the Scottish 
islands.217 
Section V.C. below will discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of the ownership unbundling approach relative to other possible structures. 
3.  Third-Party, Independent Distribution System Operator 
This possible approach is based on the current structure of the regional 
wholesale markets, pursuant to FERC Order 2000, which places operation 
of the regional transmission markets in the hands of independent, third-
party operators. Under this model, ownership is separated from operation: 
 
 211.  Neelie Kroes, Improving Competition in European Energy Markets Through 
Effective Unbundling, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1387, 1424 (2007) (defining ownership 
unbundling) [hereinafter Kroes]. 
 212.  Id. at 1425. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Michael Pollitt, Lessons from the History of Independent System Operators in 
the Energy Sector, ENERGY POLICY 47, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter Pollitt 2012]. 
 216.  National Grid, What We Do in the Electricity Industry, available at http://www2. 
nationalgrid.com/uk/our-company/electricity/. 
 217.  OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS (OFGEM), Electricity, The GB Electricity 
Transmission Network, available at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-
networks/gb-electricity-transmission-network. 
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While utilities may continue to own transmission assets, the regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs) or independent system operators 
(ISOs) operate the grid.218 This ensures that the transmission owners have 
no ability to leverage their monopoly power in the transportation 
market—by virtue of ownership of the transmission network—to gain an 
advantage in their positions in the commodity or power market. 
A leading proponent of this model, sometimes referred to as the 
Independent Distribution System Operator in the context of retail 
distribution services, or IDSO, model, is Jon Wellinghoff.219 In Wellinghoff’s 
view, the traditional utility model is “increasingly out of sync” with 
current trends in the electricity markets and the expanding penetration of 
DG resources.220 Wellinghoff’s approach starts with the perceived need 
for a fundamental reform and a re-examination of the way that utilities 
recover costs; he identified those services that are best delivered in a 
regulated monopoly environment versus those that can be provided under 
competition.221 He concludes that the solution is to let the utility continue 
to own the grid, while an “objective and separate” IDSO (independent 
distribution system operator) would operate the distribution platform.222 
Under this model, the IDSO would be responsible for the reliability of the 
distribution system and, like the ISO at the wholesale level, would ensure 
open, fair and nondiscriminatory access to the distribution platform.223 
The IDSO would also be charged with developing necessary market 
mechanisms and optimizing the deployment of DG resources.224 Unlike 
the wholesale ISO model, where the ISO is regulated by FERC, the IDSO 
would be subject to the jurisdiction of state PUCs.225 
The distribution utility would continue to be responsible for maintaining 
the distribution platform, subject to traditional rate-of-return regulation by 
state PUCs, and would thereby be permitted to earn a return on any 
additional investments in the distribution system.226 The distribution 
utility would also continue to maintain the customer relationship with end 
users (including the billing function).227 Under this model, the distribution 
 
 218.  Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, at 235 (1999) available 
at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf. 
 219.  Wellinghoff was Chairman of FERC from 2009 to 2013, and is currently a partner 
in the law firm of Stoel Rives LLP. See Jon B. Wellinghoff, Attorneys, STOEL RIVES LLP,  
http://www.stoel.com/jwellinghoff. 
 220.  Tong and Wellinghoff, supra note 153, at 4. 
 221.  Id. at 4. 
 222.  Id. at 2. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
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utility would benefit from having a much simpler (and less risky) business 
model, more efficient cost recovery, and the ability of its unregulated 
affiliates to offer competitive services (e.g., investing in DG resources) in 
areas outside of its service territory.228 Wellinghoff identifies the following 
benefits to the IDSO model: more effective and efficient integration of 
DG resources, increased utilization of the existing grid, more opportunities 
for consumer choice and participation, and stimulating the development 
of a “Transactive Energy Framework” that would accommodate commerce 
in energy services.229 
The Track One Proposal in New York’s REV proceeding rejected the 
recommendation to establish an independent DSP.230 The Proposal 
acknowledged several advantages to the independent DSP, such as the 
ability to establish uniform, statewide practices (in contrast to the DSPs 
operated by individual utilities), and avoidance of market power issues 
regarding utility ownership of distributed energy resources.231 Moreover, 
an independent DSP may be more effective at stimulating technological 
innovation.232 The Track One Proposal also identified “numerous 
drawbacks” to an independent DSP, however, including the addition of 
significant redundant costs given that the DSP would perform many of the 
functions currently performed by utilities, and the addition of duplicative 
functions at the DSP with respect to the system planning and operations 
functions of the utilities.233 The Track One Proposal concluded that use 
of an independent DSP approach would be an “expensive, unwieldy, and 
incomplete response.”234 As noted above, the New York PSC in its Track 
One Order largely adopted this analysis, finding that there would be “no 
value in adding to consumer burdens” the costs associated with creating 
an independent DSP.235 
Section V.C. below will discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of the third-party, independent system operator approach relative to other 
possible structures. 
 
 228.  Id. at 2–3. 
 229.  Id. at 2 
 230.  TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 13, at 19. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 21. 
 235.  TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 69, at 50. 
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V.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURINGS 
This section discusses the actual experience under the various business 
models, based on previous initiatives to restructure the electric utility 
industry both in the United States and Europe.  The subsequent sections 
discuss functional unbundling, where FERC’s experience under Order 
888 and subsequent issuance of Order 2000 provide some guidance on 
the success of this business model in addressing market power issues. The 
European Union also has experience with a business model based on 
functional unbundling, and a number of EU member nations have recently 
moved to an ownership-unbundled model, thereby providing some basis 
for comparison. With respect to the independent, third-party ownership 
structure, the seven RTOs currently operating in the U.S. provide some 
basis upon which to evaluate the success of that model. 
A.  Functional Unbundling 
1.  FERC’s Restructuring of the Electric Wholesale Markets 
As noted above, FERC’s Order 888 was intended to promote competition 
in the wholesale electricity markets by removing impediments arising 
largely from the exercise of market power by transmission owners over 
the interstate transmission grid.236 In addition to requiring all public 
utilities owning or controlling transmission facilities to offer open, fair 
and non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid, Order 888 attempted 
to deal with the market power issue by requiring functional unbundling.237 
The functional unbundling requirements included, among other things, the 
separation of transmission system functions and staffs within a public 
utility from wholesale generation marketing functions and staff, and 
abiding by codes of conduct that defined impermissible contacts between 
transmission and generation personnel.238 
Within four years, however, FERC issued its Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on Regional Transmission Organizations, and concluded that 
functional unbundling had largely failed to achieve the goal of eliminating 
opportunities for transmission owners to unduly discriminate in the 
operation of their transmission systems in order to favor the power 
marketing activities of their affiliates.239 As stated in the RTO NOPR, 
“there are indications that continued discrimination in the provision of 
 
 236.  ORDER 888, supra note 167. 
 237.  OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 166, at 17681; ORDER 888, supra note 167, at 60. 
 238.  Regional Transmission Organizations; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 31390–01 (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter RTO NOPR]. 
 239.  Id. at 31397. 
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transmission services by vertically integrated utilities may . . . be impeding 
fully competitive electricity markets.”240 
FERC acknowledged that utilities exercising monopoly power over 
transmission facilities (while also having power marketing interests) have 
“poor incentives” to provide adequate transmission services to their power 
marketing competitors and, in fact, it is in their economic self-interest to 
frustrate their competitors in favor of their own power marketing operations.241 
Fundamentally, functional unbundling did nothing to change these incentives, 
but attempted to minimize the ability of the transmission-owning utilities 
to act on those incentives.242 FERC proceeded to identify the continued 
discriminatory conduct by transmission owners that represent remaining 
impediments to competition.243 More generally, the RTO NOPR expresses 
concern about the “extensive regulatory oversight and administrative burdens” 
associated with enforcement of the standards of conduct.244 On this point, 
the RTO NOPR states: 
[A] system that attempts to control behavior that is motivated by economic self-
interest through the use of standards of conduct will require constant and extensive 
policing. This kind of regulation goes beyond traditional price regulation and forces 
us to regulate very detailed aspects of internal company policy and communication. 
For functional unbundling to be successful, we have to be concerned, in some 
sense, about ‘who spoke to whom’ in the company cafeteria. Functional unbundling 
does not necessarily promote light-handed regulation. It also imposes a cost on 
those entities that have to comply with the standards of conduct who face 
additional training and rules that create rigidities in their internal management 
activities.245 
The RTO NOPR also noted the implications of continued allegations of 
discrimination by the transmission owners. First, there is the challenge of 
 
 240.  Id. at 31391. 
 241.  Id. at 31402.  FERC acknowledged the views of some that functional unbundling 
cannot be expected to eliminate efforts by transmission owners to gain an economic 
advantage, particularly considering that investor-owned utilities have an obligation to 
maximize shareholder value, id. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. The discriminatory conduct included the pattern of transmission owners to 
understate the available transmission capacity (ATC) on paths valuable to competitors, or 
to divert capacity so that it is available for use by affiliated power marketing interests, id. 
at 31403; violations of standards of conduct, which indicate a failure of functional 
separation, id. at 31405–06; discrimination in implementing line loading relief, id. at 
31406, and OASIS sites that are difficult to use, id. 
 244.  Id. at 31406. 
 245.  Id. at 31407. 
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detecting such conduct, the inefficiency of the complaint process, and the 
insufficiency of any penalties in providing a deterrence.246 More 
fundamentally, the RTO NOPR expresses the concern that such allegations 
represent a perception by market participants that the market is not 
operating fairly, given that the integrated utilities have the incentive and 
continued opportunity to discriminate.247 This fear of an unfair advantage 
may inhibit the willingness of market participants to invest in the market, 
thereby jeopardizing the development of robust competition.248 As stated 
in the NOPR, this “perception that many entities that operate the transmission 
system cannot be trusted is not a good foundation on which to build a 
competitive power market” in that it “creates uncertainty and risk for new 
investments in generation.”249 
In its Order 2000, issued six months later, FERC adopted a final rule 
that required public utilities to make various filings geared toward the 
formation of regional transmission organizations.250 Because such 
organizations included “minimum characteristics” requiring their independence 
from transmission owners, FERC determined that RTOs could remove 
remaining opportunities for discriminatory transmission practices.251 In 
contrast to the heavy policing required under functional unbundling, FERC 
expressed the view that “a properly structured RTO would reduce the need 
for Commission oversight and scrutiny,” thereby benefitting both FERC 
and the industry.252 Because the RTO would be independent of any power 
marketing interests, FERC would no longer be required to monitor and 
enforce compliance with standards of conduct effecting functional  
unbundling.253 
2.  Experience in the European Union 
Electricity Directives issued by the European Union in 2003 required 
functional unbundling by directing that transmission owners separate their 
 
 246.  Id. at 31403. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. at 31406. 
 250.  Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1999), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf at 1. 
 251.  Id. at 3. Order 2000 requires that all RTOs be independent of any market 
participants.  Id. at 152.  Independence is satisfied by (1) the RTO, its employees, and any 
non-stakeholder directors not having any financial interest in any market participants; 
(2) the RTO having a decision-making process that is independent of control by any 
market participant; and (3) the RTO having exclusive and independent authority to file 
changes to its transmission tariff with FERC.  Id. at 152–53. 
 252.  Id. at 96. 
 253.  Id. 
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transmission management and information functions from other aspects 
of the vertically integrated utility.254 In other words, while there was no 
required separation in the ownership of assets between the transmission 
system and the vertically integrated utility, management unbundling and 
information unbundling—through the use of “information barriers between 
supply and network activities”—was intended to avoid discrimination in 
the operation of the transmission system.255 In 2005, the European 
Commission commenced a Sector Inquiry to examine the gas and electricity 
sectors, resulting in a Final Report issued in January 2007.256 That Report 
generally found a failure of functional unbundling inasmuch as incentives 
for preferential treatment within the integrated utility remained, due to the 
“inherent conflict of interest” when vertical integration of grid operation 
is combined with generation and/or retail sales.257 As concluded by one 
observer, “incumbent suppliers view their networks as strategic assets that 
serve their commercial interests” in generation and/or retail sales.258 The 
functional unbundling regime results in a “high risk” that the network 
operator will either engage in anti-competitive behavior or operate the 
network in a sub-optimal fashion.259 In addition, the fear that the network 
operator will not treat market participants fairly was perceived to have a 
“chilling effect” on third parties investing in the marketplace.260 
The Final Report found three types of discriminatory practices by 
network operators against market participants. First, there is the ability to 
grant preferential treatment to their affiliates, through such tactics as not 
making unused capacity available, complicating the interconnection process, 
or charging high balancing fees.261 The second practice is referred to as 
“information leakage,” where “Chinese walls” are violated by information 
that is exchanged between the system operator and the competitive activities 
of its affiliates.262 Another example is the ability of top management of a 
 
 254.  Kroes, supra note 211, at 1394. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. at 1402 (citing Commission of the European Communities, Communication 
from the Commission, Inquiry Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 into 
the European Gas and Electricity Sectors (Final Report), COM (2006) 851 Final (Jan. 2007)). 
 257.  Kroes, supra note 211, at 1405. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. at 1406. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. at 1406–07. It should be noted that these activities may be difficult to detect, 
even by an experienced regulatory agency.  Id. at 1406. 
 262.  Id. at 1407–08. 
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generating company, represented at the parent level of the corporate 
organization, having access to strategic business information of the 
network operator.263 In addition, some central functions, such as legal 
services, are provided across the affiliated group of companies, providing 
opportunities for access to information that is not available to third-party 
market participants.264 Third, the incentives driving investment decisions 
remain distorted, with bias in favor of meeting the needs of generating 
affiliates rather than investing in infrastructure that might enable additional 
competition.265 As stated by one observer, “[t]he interest in protecting the 
market power and profitability of their [generating] business trumps the 
interest in increasing (regulated) network business.”266 An over-arching 
issue with respect to all three practices relates to the difficulty encountered 
by regulators in enforcing the functional unbundling requirements, due to 
insufficient resources, a lack of monitoring, and lack of authority.267 
B.  Relevant Experience with Ownership Unbundling and                  
Independent RTO Approaches 
The various approaches for achieving the separation of the transmission 
function have been implemented in different electricity markets, and this 
experience provides some basis for analysis of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the options for the structure of the industry. The preceding 
section described the restructuring of the wholesale electricity market in 
the U.S., and the shortcomings identified by FERC with respect to functional 
unbundling. Two other options warrant discussion: the independent system 
operator, as illustrated by RTOs in the U.S., and ownership unbundling, 
as illustrated by ITSOs in Europe. 
With respect to the first approach, FERC’s conclusion in Order 2000 
was that the independent RTO approach, by “cleanly separating the 
control of transmission from power market participants,” would be effective 
in reducing opportunities for unduly discriminatory conduct.268 Because 
the RTO would have no financial interest in any market participant—under 
the “minimum characteristic” requirement of independence—and no power 
market participant would be able to control an RTO, the economic 
incentive—as well as the ability—of the transmission provider to engage 
in discriminatory practices would be eliminated.269 This approach would 
 
 263.  Id. at 1408. 
 264.  Id. at 1408–09. 
 265.  Id. at 1409. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. at 1410. 
 268.  18 C.F.R. pt. 35, supra note 250, at 90. 
 269.  Id. 
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also eliminate the “mistrust” in current grid management, and thereby 
attract new participants in the generation market inasmuch as the market 
will be perceived as more fair and attractive for investment.270 With the 
addition of more participants, the market can be expected to be deeper and 
more fluid.271 
An issue with this approach, as compared with the functional and 
ownership unbundling approaches, is the cost of implementation. On this 
point, Order 2000 suggests that the flexibility permitted in the Order 
would allow for the creation of “streamlined” organizational structures 
that need not be costly.272 Given the flexibility possible in meeting the 
minimum characteristics, the admittedly high costs associated with formation 
of existing ISOs and power exchanges may not be relevant, according to 
Order 2000.273 In contrast to formation costs, FERC claims benefits from 
RTO formation of $2.4 billion to $5.1 billion annually, which represents 
1.1 to 2.4% of the total costs in the electric power industry.274 
There is considerable evidence on the costs associated with operating 
some of the existing RTOs. Seven RTOs currently operate in the U.S.—
ISO New England, MidContinent ISO (formerly known as Midwest ISO), 
PJM Interconnection, Southwest Power Pool, California ISO, New York 
ISO, and Electric Reliability Council of Texas.275 The MidContinent ISO, 
the RTO serving all or parts of 15 states in central U.S.,276 has 782 employees 
and an annual budget of $273 million.277 PJM, which is the RTO operating 
in the Mid-Atlantic states, has 725 employees and an annual budget of $252 
million.278 As stated by one commentator, these costs are “non-trivial.”279 
Moreover, this commentator expressed the concern that ISOs are “simply 
bureaucracies that are not subject to any effective cost regulation.”280 He 
 
 270.  Id. at 92–93. 
 271.  Id. at 93. 
 272.  Id. at 91. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. at 95–96. 
 275.  U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Electricity Restructuring: FREC 
Could Take Additional Steps to Analyze Regional Transmission Organizations’ Benefits 
and Performance, 3 (Sep. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281312.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 276.  MISO, Locations, https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/Locations/Pages/Locations. 
aspx. (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 277.  Pollitt 2012, supra note 215, at 37. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id. at 36. 
 280.  Id. at 40. 
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points to the sharp increases in ISO costs in the U.S. in recent years, and 
notes that the number of employees at the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) 
has grown from 39 in 1998 to 131 in 2004 and 473 in 2010.281 A former 
PSC Commissioner in New York complained about the absence of 
ratepayer participation in the process at RTOs, and noted that the cost per 
New York resident for services provided by the New York ISO is 
41 percent higher than the same figure for the PJM Interconnection.282 
A GAO Report also expresses concern about the process for stakeholder 
participation in RTO decisions that affect electricity prices.283 It notes the 
expectation of FERC that RTOs would be subject to lighter regulation, 
given the requirements set forth in Order 2000 regarding stakeholder 
participation.284 As a practical matter, however, the GAO Report observed 
that the stakeholder process is very “resource intensive,” with up to 600 
meetings at one RTO open to stakeholder participation in a typical year.285 
Stakeholders representing consumers complained that RTOs fail to give 
adequate consideration on the impact of decisions on electricity prices in 
their decision-making process,286 and that RTOs place too much emphasis 
on reliability without considering the availability of lower cost options.287 
Consumer groups also expressed concern about the lack of frequent, 
independent review of RTO expenses and budgets by FERC,288 and FERC 
giving too much deference to the stakeholder process within the RTOs 
under the assumption that this process would provide a forum for resolving 
all concerns.289 One commenter observed that it is because of the diverse 
nature of ownership and governance in an RTO that market participants 
may not have the incentive or ability to effectively regulate the RTO’s 
performance.290 The GAO Report concluded that FERC involvement and 
oversight of RTOs was important, and recommended that FERC regularly 
review RTO financial reports to ensure that RTO expenses are clearly 
 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Heather Haddon, Power of the Purse, N.Y. POST, Apr. 10, 2011 (Transcript of 
July 15, 2010 Regular Meeting of the PSC) (Statement of Commissioner Robert Curry at 
23), available at http://nypost.com/2011/04/10/power-of-the-purse/. (In 2010, New Yorkers 
paid an average of $7.16 per person for New York ISO services, as compared with $5.24 
per person for ratepayers within the PJM Interconnection.). 
 283.  GAO REPORT, supra note 275, at 6. 
 284.  Id. at 58. 
 285.  Id. at 6. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. at 34. 
 288.  Id. at 38. 
 289.  Id. at 41. 
 290.  Pollitt 2012, supra note 215, at 41. 
VAN NOSTRAND(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  3:19 PM 
[VOL. 6:  149, 2014–15]  Getting to Utility 2.0 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 191 
reported to ensure the “cost-effectiveness” of RTOs and that their rates 
meet the “just and reasonable” standard under the Federal Power Act.291 
With respect to the second option—the ITSO model—the experience in 
Europe provides some guidance on the relative performance of this industry 
structure, which features an independent transmission system operator 
that both owns and operates the grid, and is prohibited from investing in 
electricity generation or providing service to retail customers.292 The ITSO 
model results in a concentration of ownership of transmission assets, as 
compared to the “asset-lite” RTO model, where the utilities continue to 
own the transmission assets even though the network is operated by the 
RTO.293 This difference in characteristics means that different options are 
available for regulating the entities and, more specifically, the availability 
of incentive mechanisms.294 Because the RTO model is “asset lite,” there 
are insufficient financial resources within the RTO structure to absorb any 
significant penalty for under performance.295 The size of the financial 
penalties may therefore be very low as compared to the negative impacts 
flowing from under-performance, making performance incentives challenging 
to design.296 
In the case of the ITSO model, however, the concentration of transmission 
assets results in the financial strength to withstand strong incentive 
mechanisms.297 National Grid Electricity Transmission, for example, 
operated under an incentive/penalty mechanism of 1–4% of total revenue 
that was imposed to provide incentives to reduce congestion on the 
transmission network.298 This “powerful incentive” would not be available 
under the RTO model, where the ownership and operation of the transmission 
grid are not integrated.299 In addition, one commenter has noted that the 
regulators at the state and national level in the United States lack sufficient 
experience with the use of incentive mechanisms in regulating the 
monopoly functions of the electricity system.300  Moreover, given the 
complexity and the large number of outputs associated with an RTO, it 
 
 291.  GAO REPORT, supra note 275, at 59. 
 292.  Pollitt 2012, supra note 215, at 32. 
 293.  Id. at 33. 
 294.  Id. at 40. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id. at 41. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Id. 
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would be challenging to develop a comprehensive system of metrics to 
gauge the performance of the RTO’s operation.301 Another commenter 
described the regulation and cost control at RTOs as “unsatisfactory” 
when compared with the use of incentive regulation for ITSOs in Europe.302 
An additional commenter referred to the risk of RTOs becoming “self-
perpetuating bureaucracies” having innate incentives to prevent evolution 
of the energy toward the ITSO structure.303 
Another function of the transmission organization is determining the 
optimal level of investment in transmission facilities. On this point, RTOs 
are said to under-invest in transmission because of the multi-jurisdictional 
nature of the organizations, and the divergence between regional, RTO-
wide benefits and the recovery of costs within individual states, where 
regulators may be unwilling to increase transmission charges to recover 
the costs.304 As evidence of this, one commenter cites the relatively high 
congestion costs within the PJM Interconnection, suggesting an under-
investment in the transmission system.305 Another commenter, noting the 
reduced incentives for investing in transmission, refers to RTOs as having 
an “identity crisis” inasmuch as they “do not have the incentives and 
motivation of a pure transmission company, nor do they have the competence 
and responsibility of a public transmission owner.”306 Thus, while the 
independence of RTOs successfully achieves non-discriminatory access 
objectives, the issue of investment adequacy remains.307 
ITSOs, on the other hand, are said to have a tendency to over-invest in 
transmission, given their “clear incentive to inflate estimates of investment 
requirements,”308 which may result in “potentially excessive expansions 
in transmission assets.”309 At the same time, ITSOs are better equipped to 
achieve an “optimal configuration” through investments in both hardware 
and software.310 RTOs, for their part, have the advantage of being relatively 
easy to scale up across independently owned transmission systems.311 In 
the case of both the RTO and ITSO models, strong regulatory oversight 
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 310.  Pollitt 2012, supra note 215, at 47. 
 311.  Id. The RTOs currently in operation in the U.S. cover part or all of 35 states and 
the District of Columbia, and serve over half of the electricity demand. GAO REPORT, supra 
note 275, at 3. 
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will be necessary to ensure the correct level of  investment in the 
transmission system.312 
Available data from the European experience confirm the positive 
correlation between ownership unbundling and investment in the networks.313 
Where the transmission services were provided by an ownership-
unbundled operator, data show a “significant and consistent increase in 
investment levels” following the legal unbundling.314 In contrast, the 
levels of investment are comparatively lower where the transmission 
services operator is part of a vertically integrated utility.315 It should also 
be noted that investment in the network by ownership-unbundled 
operators would benefit from a lower cost of capital associated with the 
network business versus the vertically integrated business.316 The less-
risky nature of the regulated network business translates into lower capital 
costs, and thus the costs associated with financing investments in the 
network will be lower.317 
Another metric to consider is the impact of the industry structure on 
electricity prices. Evidence from the European Union suggests  that 
weakening the market power of the vertically integrated utilities—through 
ownership unbundling, for example—results in lower energy prices.318 As 
part of the Impact Assessment performed for the Commission of European 
Communities, price trends for nations with and without ownership-
unbundled network operators were compared for the period of 1998-
2006.319 This analysis showed that while electricity prices increased by 
six percent in those countries with vertically integrated network operators, 
prices declined by three percent in countries with ownership-unbundled 
network operators.320 
 
 312.  Id. at 46. 
 313.  Kroes, supra note 211, at 1426. 
 314.  Id. at 1426–27. The Sector Inquiry showed that ownership-unbundled system 
operators reinvested about twice as much of their congestion revenue into the network 
(33.3%) than the integrated system operators (16.8%).  Id. at 1427. 
 315.  Id. The commenter notes that a vertically integrated transmission service operator 
has a disincentive to investment in transmission infrastructure that enables additional 
competitors to enter the generation markets. Id. at 1427. 
 316.  Id. at 1434. 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  Id. at 1431. 
 319.  Id. at 1432 (citing Commission of the European Communities, Commission 
Staff Working Document Accompanying the Legislative Package on the Internal Market 
for Electricity and Gas—Impact Assessment (SEC (2007) Final 1179, at 63). 
 320.  Id. at 1431. 
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One observer notes that the main advantage of the ownership-unbundled 
ITSOs is the elimination of the inherent conflicts of interest associated 
with vertically integrated utilities.321 While regulatory oversight would still 
be necessary, the elimination of these conflicts means that the regulation 
would be less intrusive, and the attention of the network operator could be 
focused on efficiency of the network and optimizing investments.322 Another 
commenter similarly concludes that “ownership unbundling is the simplest, 
most effective, and stable solution to solve the inherent conflict of interest 
that so clearly plagues vertically integrated [transmission system operators].323 
Efforts to strengthen functional unbundling, by focusing on management 
and information unbundling and compliance programs to avoid discrimination, 
“is doomed to remain unsuccessful,” according to this commenter.324 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
These are extremely challenging issues for regulators and policymakers 
to tackle. The provision of electric service is an essential function in the 
U.S. economy, with an increasing expectation—if not requirement—that 
the electricity supply be reliable and reasonably priced. Massive amounts 
of additional capital will need to be invested in the utility grid, both at the 
wholesale and retail level, in the coming years, so it is critical that regulators 
and policymakers “get it right” in fashioning Utility 2.0, the utility business 
model of the future. The electric utility business is capital intensive, and 
utilities must be able to continue to attract, on reasonable terms, the capital 
necessary to build a 21st century utility network, which in turn requires the 
confidence of investors that the new Utility 2.0 business model is viable 
and the regulatory framework is relatively certain and fair. 
The “business as usual” approach being followed by a number of PUCs 
around the nation may provide some short-term relief against the forces 
that are reshaping the electric industry. But regulators following that path 
are ignoring the fundamental trends, and run the risk of maintaining the 
inefficiencies of existing utility practices, to the ultimate detriment of the 
utility ratepayers they are charged with protecting. The long-term 
sustainability of the electric distribution utility depends upon timely, 
decisive actions, as the forces driving these changes—particularly the 
continuing decline in the cost of DG resources, and the essential need to 
create a grid that is more resilient in the face of increasingly frequent extreme 
weather events—will not await the outcome of a protracted debate on the 
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utility business model. The amount of electricity sales that will be “in 
play” within the current decade require a sense of urgency to this daunting 
task. 
The design of the Utility 2.0 business model must achieve a number of 
objectives. A foundational objective is a business model geared toward 
the provision of nondiscriminatory access to the distribution platform. In 
order to attract new players and additional investment in the retail electricity 
markets—to get the “innovators off the sidelines”325—it is essential that 
the rules of the game be perceived as fair, and that existing players do not 
have competitive advantages by virtue of their monopoly power. The 
current structure of vertically integrated utilities carries with it inherent 
conflicts of interest as well as the ability of the utility to exercise market 
power in the operation of the platform, to the disadvantage of potential 
new entrants into the market. 
As discussed in the preceding sections, a number of possible approaches 
are available to address these issues of market power. Functional unbundling 
is one approach, which has the advantage of being the least disruptive to 
the existing utility model and potentially requiring fairly low transaction 
and transition costs. At the same time, FERC’s experience with the 
restructuring of the wholesale electricity markets in Order 888 and its 
ultimate decision in Order 2000 to reject functional unbundling in favor 
of independent, third-party system operators, suggests that functional 
unbundling may avoid short-term pain but fails to provide the long-term 
solution. The EU experience is similar on this point. A recurring theme in 
evaluating the deficiencies of functional unbundling is the failure to 
address the underlying conflicts of interest associated with the vertically 
integrated utility, and the very high compliance costs, as regulators attempt 
to enforce codes of conduct in a valiant effort to demonstrate to third-party 
providers that the system is fair. The inability to make the fundamental 
case that the rules of the game are fair will jeopardize the attraction of new 
entrants, and associated new investment, into the energy markets. Actual 
experience suggests that the vertically integrated model, coupled with 
functional unbundling, will fail to attract the necessary investment to modernize 
 
 325.  Richard Kauffman, Chairman, N.Y. Energy and Fin., Presentation at PSC 
Symposium at Albany Law School: Shaping the Future of Energy (May 22, 2014), 
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the network, as utilities will be reluctant to make any investments that 
enable additional competition in its affiliated lines of business. 
Both ownership unbundling—the ITSO model—and the use of 
independent third party network system operators—the IDSO model—
are more effective at addressing the inherent conflicts of interest under the 
vertically integrated model, but require more fundamental restructuring of 
the business, with attendant higher transaction and transition costs. Actual 
experience suggests that either model will require continued vigilant 
regulation: in the case of the ITSO, to prevent over-investment in the network 
and, in the case of the IDSO, to ensure that the enterprise does not  
unnecessarily expand to create an excessive layer of additional costs to be 
passed on to ratepayers. In this regard, the track record of RTOs in the 
United States is somewhat unsettling, as the extensive stakeholder process 
contemplated by FERC as a check on RTO expenditures does not seem to 
be effective, given the rapid growth in employees and budgets in recent 
years and the claimed failure to give much consideration to impacts on 
retail electricity rates. 
The IDSO model proposed by Jon Wellinghoff would address this 
shortcoming to some extent, by subjecting IDSOs to regulation by state 
PUCs, which should be more effective in providing a check on unnecessary 
growth in IDSOs. At the same time, the Track One Proposal in New York 
makes a strong point that the function of the IDSOs is largely duplicative 
of the functions currently carried out by the distribution utilities, and there 
is some question as to the cost-effectiveness of adding an additional layer 
of bureaucracy. FERC wrestled with the same issue in its RTO NOPR, and 
concluded that the efficiencies gained by market participants having 
greater confidence in the fairness of the market structure outweighed the 
higher administrative costs associated with the operation of RTOs. The 
same analysis would seem to apply at the retail distribution level. 
The design of the Utility 2.0 model is just the first step in the process. 
Following that determination, regulators must tackle an equally daunting 
task of designing a regulatory framework that corresponds with the 
changes in the underlying utility business model, and preserves the long-
term viability of Utility 2.0. In order for investors to devote the necessary, 
vast sums of capital to the industry to create a 21st century utility network, 
they must have confidence in the predictability and certainty of the 
regulatory framework. To the extent the range of services provided by the 
incumbent distribution utility shrinks under Utility 2.0, regulators will be 
under pressure to create new revenue opportunities for utilities in order to 
preserve the long-term viability of the utility business model.  In any event, 
the regulatory framework for electric utilities in the U.S. will need to 
evolve to one that rewards utilities based on their success in meeting their 
customers’ energy needs, rather than on their success in selling more 
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electricity. Designing this regulatory framework, on the heels of shaping 
the Utility 2.0 business model, will provide plenty of challenges for regulators 
and policymakers for the remainder of the decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
